Bayesian Network Trust Model for Certificate Revocation in Adhoc Wireless Networks by Chinni, Sudha







Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University
Hyderabad, India
2002
Submitted to the faculty of the
Graduate College of the
Oklahoma State University











      Dr. Johnson Thomas
   __________________________________
Thesis Advisor
      Dr.  John P. Chandler
   __________________________________
      Dr. Debao Chen
   __________________________________
                              Dr. Gordon Emslie
   __________________________________
Dean of the Graduate College
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my sincere and heart full gratitude to Dr.Johnson Thomas for 
giving me an opportunity to work under his guidance, I would also like to thank him for 
his consistent guidance, valuable suggestions and commendable support for the 
successful completion of my thesis. 
I would like to extend my hearty thanks to Dr.John Chandler and Dr.Debao Chen for 
their support and cooperation.
I take pleasure to thank my parents for their love and support for pursuing my Masters at 
Oklahoma State University. Finally, I wish to convey my sincere thanks to all the 
teaching and non-teaching staff of the Dept of Computer Science, Oklahoma state 
university, without whose cooperation this venture would not have been a success.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter                                                                                                                           Page
   I     INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................... 1
1.1 WIRELESS INTERNET ............................................................................................ 1
1.1.1 Infrastructure Mode ................................................................................... 2
1.1.2 Ad hoc Mode.............................................................................................. 3
1.2 SECURITY IN NETWORKS....................................................................................... 4
II    ADHOC WIRELESS NETWORKS.......................................................................... 7
2.1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 7
2.2 APPLICATIONS ....................................................................................................... 8
2.2.1 Integration of Bluetooth and Ad hoc wireless networks.............................. 9
  2.2.2 Future application ...................................................................................... 10
2.3 LIMITATIONS........................................................................................................ 10
2.4 CHALLENGES OF AD HOC WIRELESS NETWORKS................................................... 11
2.5 MOBILITY MODELS FOR AD HOC NETWORKS...................................................... 12
2.5.1 Random Waypoint Mobility Model........................................................... 13
III  SECURITY IN   NETWORKS................................................................................. 15
3.1 SECURITY THREATS ............................................................................................. 15
3.2 PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURES ........................................................................... 16
3.3 DIGITAL CERTIFICATE.......................................................................................... 19
3.4 CERTIFICATE RENEWAL....................................................................................... 19
3.5 TYPES OF CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES(CA) ...................................................... 20
v
Chapter                                                                                                                   Page 
3.6 THRESHOLD CRYPTOGRAPHY .............................................................................. 20
3.6.1 Principles of the threshold Cryptography .................................................. 22
3.6.2 Applications of Threshold Cryptography .................................................. 23
3.7 INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS......................................................................... 24
IV   TRUST PROBLEM IN AD HOC WIRELESS NETWORKS.................................. 25
4.1 TRUST MODELS .................................................................................................... 25
4.2 DISTRIBUTED TRUST MODEL ................................................................................ 29
4.3 DYNAMIC COALESCING ....................................................................................... 29
4.4 TRUST MODEL ..................................................................................................... 30
4.5 DISADVANTAGES ................................................................................................. 31
V    TRUST...................................................................................................................... 33
5.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 33
5.2 DEFINITION OF TRUST.......................................................................................... 33
5.3 TYPES OF TRUST .................................................................................................. 34
5.4 PREVALENCE OF TRUST ....................................................................................... 34
5.5 NATURE OF TRUST............................................................................................... 35
VI PROPOSED SOLUTION......................................................................................... 36
6.1 TRUST MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK ..................................................................... 36
6.2 MOTIVATION........................................................................................................ 38
6.3 WORKING MECHANISM OF THE MODEL................................................................. 39
6.4 COMMUNICATION OF THE NODE ........................................................................... 40
6.5 LOCAL ENVIRONMENT OF A NODE ........................................................................ 41
6.6 INTRUSION DETECTION UNIT ................................................................................ 43
6.7 COMMUNICATION OF A NODE UNDER DIFFERENT SCENARIOS ............................... 45
6.8 SENDING & SEEKING RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................... 47
6.9 CERTIFICATE REVOCATION.................................................................................. 52
vi
Chapter                                                                                                                           Page
VII  SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS............................................................................ 54
7.1 AD HOC NETWORK MODEL .................................................................................... 55
7.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF A DISTRIBUTED TRUST MODEL ............................................ 57
    7.2.1 Advantages................................................................................................... 61
7.2.2 Shortcomings ............................................................................................... 61
7.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF A BAYESIAN NETWORK TRUST MODEL................................. 62
    7.3.1 Advantages................................................................................................... 68
    7.3.2 Shortcomings ............................................................................................... 69
7.4 SIMULATION ASSUMPTIONS .................................................................................... 69
7.5 RESULTS................................................................................................................. 71
VIII  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK ................................................................ 82





Table                                                                                                                            Page
1. CERTIFICATE REVOCATION LIST MAINTAINED BY EACH NODE................................... 30
2. A TABLE IN THE NODE’S LOCAL ENVIRONMENT......................................................... 47
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure                                                                                                                             Page
1. EXAMPLE APPLICATION OF AD HOC WIRELESS NETWORK ........................................ 3
2. NODES IN AD HOC WIRELESS NETWORKS ................................................................. 8 
3. APPLICATIONS OF AD HOC NETWORKS . ................................................................... 8
4. WAYS OF UTILIZING BLUETOOTH TECHNOLOGY… ............................................... 10
5. HOME WIRELESS AD HOC APPLICATIONS. .............................................................. 10
6. WORKING OF A PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM ......................................................... 17
7. WORKING OF A PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE ....................................................... 18
8. A SAMPLE AD HOC NETWORK................................................................................. 36
9. FLOWCHART DESCRIBING THE FUNCTIONS OF A NODE............................................ 39
10. BAYESIAN NETWORK MODEL................................................................................. 40
11. LOCAL ENVIRONMENT OF A NODE IN AN AD HOC NETWORK................................... 42
12. FLOWCHART FOR A NODE COMMUNICATING IN A TRUST ENVIRONMENT ................ 47
13. FLOWCHART DESCRIBING HOW A NODE SENDS RECOMMENDATIONS...................... 51
14. FLOW CHART DESCRIBING CERTIFICATE REVOCATION ........................................... 52
15. COMPARISON OF THE USEFUL COMMUNICATION IN THE TWO TRUST MODELS......... 71
16. COMPARISON OF THE USEFUL COMMUNICATION IN THE TWO TRUST MODELS......... 72
17. MALICIOUS AND INNOCENT NODES REMOVED IN SCHEME-1................................... 73
18. MALICIOUS AND INNOCENT NODES REMOVED IN SCHEME-2................................... 73
19. MALICIOUS NODES REMAINING IN SCHEME-1 ........................................................ 74
20. MALICIOUS NODES REMAINING IN SCHEME-2 ........................................................ 75
21. GOOD NODES REMAINING IN SCHEME-1 ................................................................. 75
22. GOOD NODES REMAINING IN SCHEME-2 ................................................................. 76
23. NETWORK UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DOS ATTACKING NODES(SCHEME-1) ........... 77
24. NETWORK UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DOS ATTACKING NODES (SCHEME-2) .......... 77
ix
Figure                                                                                                                             Page
25. NETWORK UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DOS ATTACKING NODES (SCHEME-2) .......... 78
26. NETWORK UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DOS ATTACKING NODES(SCHEME-2) ........... 78
27. NETWORK UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF HIJACKING NODES (SCHEME-1).................... 79
28. NETWORK UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF HIJACKING NODES (SCHEME-1).................... 80
29. NETWORK UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF HIJACKING NODES (SCHEME-2).................... 80
30. NETWORK UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF HIJACKING NODES (SCHEME-2).................... 81
x
NOMENCLATURE
GSM                                  Global system for mobile communications
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Today’s earth is called a global village since there is no criterion of distance and time for 
communications. Man can communicate almost from one place to any other place in no 
time. Wireless technologies like GSM, CDMA and TDMA as well as wired protocols 
such as TCP/IP make this possible.  Business organizations as well as individuals are 
increasingly dependent on mobile communications and the Internet.  The integration of
the internet and wireless communication has led to the advent of wireless internet.   
1.1 Wireless internet: 
The Wireless internet is different from the wired internet in the aspect of maintaining 
communication channels between computers. In the wired internet they are maintained 
through cables, whereas in the wireless internet, they are maintained through radio waves 
or micro waves. The main reason for the popularity of the wireless internet is its mobility 
and the ease of installation and setup. 
The wireless internet has advantages over the wired internet in the following scenarios:
 When a building is not pre-wired with network cable, it will be more cost 
effective to install and use wireless internet to network the computers rather than 
wiring the building and installing wired internet components.
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 In business environments or at home when wireless internet is used, the user is 
not restricted to a particular location and is able to be mobile. 
 Bulky cabling can be avoided for both business and home networks.[1]
The Wireless internet is broadly classified into two types:
1. Infrastructure  mode
2. Ad hoc mode
1.1.1 Infrastructure Mode: 
When this kind of mode is used for networking the computers, there are a set of wireless 
devices and wired devices in the network. The wireless devices can communicate with 
the wired devices through a central point called the “Access point”. Therefore, if a
wireless device wants to transfer a file, share a file or access a resource in the network, it 
has to communicate with the access point first. In this mode, the configuration of the 
access point plays a crucial role.
To ensure proper working of the network the Access point should be placed at a point 
where the wireless device can communicate with minimal interference. Various standards 
have been proposed including 802.11a, 802.11b, and 802.11g. 802.11g is the current best 
standard for wireless internet due to the following reasons:
 Very high speed
 Supports More number of simultaneous users
 Better signal range with less interference
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Applications:
The infrastructure mode is applicable in
 scenarios where a wired and wireless infrastructure is present
 It is therefore good for both home and business networking
1.1.2 Ad hoc Mode:
In this mode there is no attachment to a wired network; each device can talk to another 
without any central point (Access point). Here the wireless devices can only share files; 
they cannot share any resources as they are not connected to any network. The 
communication is similar to a peer to peer communication.
This mode offers a superior mobility than the former approach as there is no 
attachment with networking cables; the wireless card attached to the device passes radio 
signals to the access point for accessing the internet, hence maximum mobility is 
achieved without worrying about staying at a place where the network cable is attached. 
Any 802.11 standard can be used for the Ad hoc mode. [1]
Figure 1: Example application of Ad hoc wireless network [2]
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Applications:
The ad hoc mode is applicable where a wired infrastructure may not be available such as 
in:
 Military operations
 Emergency search-and-rescue missions
 Data collection/sensor networks
 Instantaneous classroom/meeting room applications
 1.2 Security in networks:
The Internet has made shopping, banking, investment and leisure pursuits a simple matter 
of “clicking and dragging”. Consequently, industries and business rely heavily on the 
internet to operate and conduct business. The online business has become a platform for 
purchasing goods, money transfers and credit card purchases to name a few business 
transactions, which makes online transactions more vulnerable to cyberspace criminals. 
The online business has resulted in different kinds of thefts of which identity theft is only 
one of the many potential kinds of attacks and thefts. There are a number of threats to 
computer security including viruses, worms, intruders, insiders, criminal organizations, 
terrorists and information warfare conducted by foreign countries. Due to these reasons it 
is highly essential to safeguard the networks and systems. In the case of a wired network 
steps can be taken to minimize the attacks by installing patches to the operating systems, 
installing firewalls or monitoring traffic at core routers. All this is possible as the network 
is connected and there is a central point for administrative operations. 
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In Ad hoc wireless networks, security is very difficult to handle since the network 
is wireless, which provides more scope for attacks and more room for intruders.
Providing security to systems in an ad hoc network is very difficult for a number of 
reasons. The communications takes place in an open medium which permits 
eavesdropping, there is no central administrative point and the number of nodes in the 
network is never constant. As nodes can enter or leave the system in the absence of a 
central authority each node in the network needs to be authenticated before it can start 
communicating [3].
To ensure security, each node in the network is given a certificate which 
authenticates it for communicating in the network; this is valid for a fixed period of time 
after which the certificate needs to be revoked. The performance of each node in the 
network is monitored during the certificate validity period and if it is not up to 
expectations the node is not reissued a certificate the next time. This mechanism ensures 
that the nodes in the network are legitimate nodes and there is no malicious activity 
prevailing in the network. This is achieved with the help of “certificate revocation lists”. 
A certificate revocation list is a table maintained by each node in the network which 
contains the ID’s of the misbehaving nodes and the list of accusers. If the number of 
accusers against the node are greater than a threshold (a globally fixed value) then the 
node is marked as convicted.
If the number of accusers is below the threshold then the node is marked as a 
suspect. Certificates are not granted to convicted nodes. In this thesis we propose a novel 
scheme for certificate revocation which is implemented using Bayesian artificial 
intelligence. A comparison is made on two trust models, one with Bayesian Networks 
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and one without Bayesian networks using simulation. This thesis is organized into the 
following sections. Chapter 2 provides a general introduction to ad hoc wireless networks 
and the associated mobility models. Chapter 3 introduces various security mechanisms 
used in networked applications. Chapter 4 gives a review of trust models for ad hoc 
wireless network and describes a trust model that is the basis for this work .Chapter 5 
discusses the importance and nature of trust. Chapter 6 gives the solution to the various 
problems identified in chapter 4 by proposing the implementation of a novel trust model 
using Bayesian artificial intelligence. Chapter 7 compares two trust models using 




 ADHOC WIRELESS NETWORKS
2.1 Introduction:
An Ad hoc wireless network or MANET (Mobile Ad hoc NETwork) is formed 
dynamically by a group of moving nodes. It has no infrastructure, and the network has no 
backbone or a central point of communication. 
 In this kind of network there are no routers, hubs or other intermediate devices 
for communication; each node acts as a router and transfers information. An Ad hoc 
network may consist of a mixture of heterogeneous devices that are capable of 
communicating over the wireless channel .Multi hop routing is performed by the devices 
in the network due to the limited transmission range of the interfaces. Hence an ad hoc 
network is also called a multi hop network [4].
Ad hoc wireless networks have proven to be very useful in scenarios where there 
is no fixed infrastructure, where it is very difficult to establish base stations and where 
timely updating and maximum mobility is required.      
8
Figure 2: Nodes in ad hoc wireless networks [3]
2.2 Applications:
Figure 3: Applications of Ad hoc networks [5].
There are various areas where Ad hoc networking can be used; these include the 
following:
1. Conferences:  The use of Ad hoc networks in such environments will enable the 
exchange of ideas at any time and at any place, providing portability and mobility 
in communication.
2. Military operations: In the battlefield, Communication of voice as well as data is
required. Battles take place in isolated places where there are no civilians, 
generally on rough terrains where the establishment of base stations is very 
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difficult. Hence ad hoc networks can be very useful for communication because 
of the mobility it provides.
3. Disaster / Rescue operations: Whenever a disaster or a calamity occurs there is a 
high possibility that the communication links are damaged, hence any kind of 
communication relying on infrastructure is not helpful. In such situations ad hoc 
networks provide a means for communication.
4. Civil Enforcement operation: Whenever there is an emergency situation, law 
enforcement officials need to be in contact, wherever they are, Ad hoc networks 
are well-suited to these situations due to portability and mobility and non-
interdependence on fixed infrastructure.
5. Home networking: Ad hoc networks may be used at home to inter-connect 
computers and to transfer files. 
6. Collaborative applications : In collaborative applications, a set of people work 
on the same project and share their work on the network., In such situations ad
hoc networks provide more mobility and portability and information can be 
shared anywhere at anytime.[2]
2.2.1 Integration of Bluetooth and Ad hoc wireless networks:
Bluetooth technology: This technology enables communication between portable 
devices without the requirement of cabling between them. This is done with the use of 
radio signals. This technology can be used in combination with ad hoc wireless networks 
as shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Ways of Utilizing Bluetooth Technology. [2]
2.2.2 Future application:
In future, with the help of ad hoc wireless networks and blue tooth technology various 
applications at home can be controlled in an ad hoc way, all with one device. [2]
This is illustrated in Figure 5:
Figure 5: Home wireless ad hoc applications. [2]
2.3 Limitations:
Ad hoc networks have a number of limitations and constraints. 
1. Changing Topology: In a mobile network the topology keeps changing as the 
nodes move. The interconnection or a link between two nodes is not fixed. This 
complicates various aspects related to communications including routing of data, 
security and authentication of nodes and quality of service to name a few.
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2. Interference: A wireless communication media introduces a lot of interference. 
Interference, results in wasteful communication. Apart from the interference 
caused by the wireless channel there may also be disruption in communication 
due to the mobility of nodes.
3. Link Capacity: Manets have lower link capacity than wired networks, due to the 
noise and limited bandwidth of wireless channels.
4. Limited Energy: A Mobile node is battery operated, which has limited life time
Hence every design issue should be taken with the view of conserving the energy 
of the devices.
5. Less Security: Since the devices are small and not connected to a fixed 
infrastructure, they are more vulnerable to malicious attacks and be stolen, 
hijacked or compromised. As the media is wireless, any device can enter or leave 
the network.
6. No central authority: Since there is no central authority or infrastructure each 
node is autonomous, hence it is difficult to synchronize the activities in the 
network [4]. 
2.4 Challenges of ad hoc wireless networks
  Among the various challenges of ad hoc wireless networks, the most crucial one is 
security. The nodes in the ad hoc network operate over the wireless media; this is 
accessible to all users including malicious attackers. Hence, it is highly vulnerable to 
attacks. The attackers can exploit or possibly disable the network.   In order to avoid 
these problems each node in the network needs to be authenticated using any 
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cryptographic mechanism which will be supported by a certificate authority (CA). Any 
disturbance with the CA will affect the security of the entire network.
Another important challenge is to provide a constant and good quality of service 
in an environment that is constantly changing. An adaptive quality of service must 
therefore be implemented over the traditional resource reservation to support the 
multimedia services in a mobile ad-hoc network. Ad hoc networks should be able to 
balance traffic load among nodes so that the power constrained nodes can be put into 
sleep mode while traffic is routed through other nodes [6]. Another important challenge is 
scalability in the view of future expansion [7, 8]. Introducing hierarchy into the network 
topology will improve scalability [8].
2.5 Mobility Models for Ad Hoc Networks
Mobility models are required to simulate the behavior of the network. When an 
authentication mechanism is imposed on the nodes, performance can be analyzed by 
simulating the network behavior based on a mobility model. A mobility model describes 
the mobility pattern of the nodes that includes their speed, direction and also their state 
being either stationary or moving. Various other factors like transmission range of each 
node and reach ability are also considered. There are two types of mobility models [9]:
1. Traces
2. Synthetic models
Traces are the data obtained from an already existing network. But when a new 
protocol needs to be tested on a non-existent network, synthetic models are used. 
Synthetic models try to mimic the movement pattern of a node in an ad hoc network [9].
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There are many synthetic mobility models such as:
1.   Random walk mobility model
2.   Random waypoint mobility model
3. Random direction mobility model
4. A boundless simulation area mobility model
5. Gauss-Markov mobility model
6. City section mobility model
7. Probabilistic version of the random walk mobility model
There are some other group mobility models that are used when the nodes move together 
as a group [10].
2.5.1 Random Waypoint Mobility Model
Random waypoint mobility model is chosen as the mobility model for this work. The 
model described in [9] is very widely used to evaluate protocols designed for ad hoc 
wireless networks. A random pause time is introduced for the nodes in between their 
movement. Maximum speed of a node, maximum pause time, number of nodes and 
simulation area are some of the inputs to this model. Each node present in the network 
follows the following steps [9]:
1. Each node is placed at a random location in the given simulation area initially.
2. A random speed is chosen for each node. The speed is less than the maximum 
speed. Also a random destination is chosen within the simulation area. The 
node begins to move towards the selected destination with the selected speed.
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3. On reaching the destination, a random amount of pause time is chosen for the 
node that is less than the maximum pause time. The node pauses at that 
location for the selected pause time.
4. The node repeats steps 2 and 3 for the entire simulation time.
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CHAPTER III
SECURITY IN   NETWORKS
The nodes in an ad hoc network are wireless, therefore there is a high possibility that they 
can be stolen, captured or compromised. Such nodes can cause considerable damage to 
the network. Handling security issues in the wireless environment is difficult as the nodes 
are mobile and there is no centralized authority. [11]
3.1 Security Threats:
The following are the possible security threats in ad hoc networks:
1. Passive Eavesdropping: Listening to other’s communication secretly is called 
Eavesdropping. In ad hoc networks, the media of communication between the 
nodes is wireless, hence any node can just listen to communication by tuning to 
that frequency.
2. Denial of service attacks: In this kind of attack, the attacking node will send 
enormously high requests to the service providing node. As a result, the 
performance of the service providing node will be slowed down. The service 
providing node may not be able to provide service to other nodes; this is called 
Denial of Service attack.
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3. Masquerading: In this kind of attack, the attacker steals the outgoing packets 
from one machine and overwrites the source IP address by its address and then 
sends it. This could be done to the packets coming from an opposite direction. 
This could be done to all packets in the network, and the entire network can come 
under the control of the attacking node. This is called masquerading and it is also 
called “spoofing”.
4. Replay: In this kind of attack the attacker tries to send the message to the sender 
as a legitimate message. For example, ‘A’ authenticates itself to ‘B’ using a 
password and the message is intercepted by an attacker ‘C’. After ‘A’ and ‘B’ 
have finished communicating, ‘C’ replays the message and ‘A’ thinks ‘B’ is the 
sender.
In the light of the above threats, it is necessary for each node to be able to defend 
itself. Authentication is the first step to self defense. When one node is 
communicating with another node or exchanging some information it should be 
assured that it is communicating with the intended node only. This is accomplished 
by the public key cryptosystems, which becomes another approach to self defense.
3.2 Public key infrastructures:
A public key infrastructure provides confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and 
authentication among the two entities that are communicating. This infrastructure is 
based upon symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems. The main advantage of a public 
key infrastructure is that it provides interoperability among the various products and 
technologies to incorporate various security mechanisms.
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Each entity will create a public, private key pair for it .When an entity wants to 
send a message to a particular entity it will encrypt the message using the public key of 
the target entity. When the target receives the encrypted message it will decrypt it with its 
private key. The public keys of the entities in the network can be obtained from a 
“Directory of public keys” or can be requested from the target entity. The secret key of an 
entity is only known to the entity and it is not revealed to anyone.  
Figure 6: Working of a public key cryptosystem
In this method we can be assured that the communication is confidential, but for a 
small glitch. There is a possibility of “man-in- the-middle attack”. In this kind of attack 
the attacking node can replace its own public key in the place of other entity’s key. As a 
result all entities send message using the fake key, there by the attacker will read all the 
messages by decrypting it with its secret key. In this attack, suppose A sends it public key 
to B. This is intercepted by an attacker C. C then sends a public key for which it has the 
secret key to B claiming to be C. Attacker C then decrypts the message. After reading it, 
the attacker will encrypt the message with the original public key of the destination node 
(the node that it attacked) and forward it to the recipient. There is no way for the entities 
in the network to know if the public key in the directory belongs to the actual entity or 
B Receives the 
message 
decrypts it with 
its secret key
 A sends a 
message to B by 
encrypting it 
with the public 
A Encryption DecryptionB
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not. In order to solve this problem a PKI has (RA) registration authorities and (CA) 
certificate authorities .The RA and CA ensure that the entity’s identity is bonded to its 
public key. Whenever a node wants to communicate in the network it needs to get a 
certificate of authentication from the RA and CA. First, the entity has to prove its identity 
to the RA, when the RA is satisfied with it, it will send a message to the CA that a 
certificate can be issued to authenticate the entity. The CA issues the certificate by 
signing it with its private key.
When ‘A’ wants to communicate with ‘B’ it will look at B’s certificate, when ‘A’ 
finds that it has been signed by the private key of the CA, it believes the identity of ‘B’ 
and starts communicating as usual by encrypting the message with B’s public key.
The RA and CA provide a trust among the nodes in the network; this is also called a 
trusted third party model [3]. 
Figure 7: working of a public key infrastructure
B Receives the message 
decrypts it with its secret 
key
A verifies B’s certificate, sends 
a message to B by encrypting it 
with the public key of A
A Encryption DecryptionB
Each entity proves it’s identity to 
the RA
RA requests the CA to 
issue the certificate
The CA issues a signed 
certificate
to the entity 
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3.3 Digital Certificate:
A digital certificate is a source of authentication for an entity to communicate in the 
network. A digital certificate also binds the entity’s identity with its public key. A 
digital certificate also contains additional information to assure the other entities the 
identity of the public key owner. Finally, the digital certificate is signed by the private 
key of the CA.The various fields of a digital certificate are as follows:
 Version number: The version of  X.509 standard used to create the certificate
 Subject: This describes the owner of the certificate
 Public Key: This will give the public key of the entity and also explains the 
algorithm used for creating the public/private key pair
 Issuer: The CA that issued the certificate
 Serial Number: A unique number given to identify each certificate.
 Validity: The time period for which the certificate is valid.
 Certificate usage: This indicates the various purposes for which the certificate can 
be used
 Signature algorithm: This indicates the algorithm used by the CA to digitally sign 
the certificate
 Extensions: The functionality of the certificate can be expanded by encoding 
additional data into the certificate.[3]
3.4 Certificate Renewal:
 Every entity needs to get its certificate renewed. The same keys can be used for the next 
cycle of certificate revocation, but the various purposes for which it can be used may be 
modified. The certificate is renewed only if the entity is not present in the certificate 
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revocation list (CRL). The certificate revocation list contains a list of nodes whose 
certificates have been suspended due to their malicious behavior in the network .They no 
longer exist in the network, for reasons aplenty. An entity whose certificate has expired 
doesn’t come under the revocation list .It is the responsibility of the CA to renew the 
certificate. CRL is maintained by the CA and it is the responsibility of the CA to update 
the list. Whenever an entity in the network wants to communicate with any other entity, it 
has to check if certificate of the opposite node is revoked. This can be done by requesting 
the CRL from the CA.
3.5 Types of Certification authorities (CA):
1. Centralized Infrastructure: The certification authority generates the public key for 
each entity; thereby it knows the private key of each entity. It gives the key to the 
requestor so that it can use its certificate.
2. Decentralized Infrastructure: In this mode every entity forms the key by itself. 
The certification authority doesn’t know the private key, and it is given the public 
key to build the certificate [3].
3.6 Threshold Cryptography:
In this section we describe threshold cryptography to create a decentralized CA. For
achieving encryption, any encryption algorithm like RSA, symmetric encryption, 
asymmetric encryption can be used. Here the public and the private key’s are very 
important. With the help of the keys the original document can be recovered, but any of 
the above algorithms safeguard only the document but not the keys, hence if the keys are 
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known the security is breached. Threshold cryptography is used to safeguard the keys, 
which in turn safeguard the documents that need to be protected.
The main idea behind “Threshold cryptography” is to break the key into several 
pieces and distribute among “n” entities such that the key can be recovered only by 
joining k or more of those pieces. The value k is called the threshold as we need at least k 
or greater number of pieces to reveal the secret.
In the following example, consider a company that digitally signs all its checks. For a 
check to be valid there should be three signatures. This is called a (3, n) threshold 
scheme. The secret company signature is divided into “n” pieces and divided among the 
employees. There is a signature generating device which needs three parts of the shared 
secret to sign the check. Hence any employee who wants to counterfeit, has to 
compromise other two employees which would be difficult. Hence this system is safe and 
secure, under the assumption that most of the employees can be trusted. [12]. Hence if 
there is a Data D and if it is split into “n” pieces and if “k” is determined to be its 
threshold
 The Data D can be reconstructed only with the knowledge of “k” or more pieces.
 If fewer than “k” pieces are known, then D cannot be revealed. [12]
The selection of threshold level “k” is very important and it can depend on the 
following factors:
 Extent of security desired.
 Type of application (for example, the entities are mobile or stable).
 The number of entities that are available all the time (in the case of mobile 
environment)
22
 The vulnerability of the system as well as the degree of trust on each entity.
3.6.1 Principles of threshold Cryptography:
A technique called Polynomial interpolation is used to share the secret among “n” 
entities. This method chooses a value for “k” which should obviously be less than “n”.
This technique is devised in such a way that (k-1) entities cannot collaboratively reveal 
the secret and it needs at least “k” entities to generate the complete secret. [12]
Let D be the secret to be shared:
Consider a polynomial of (k-1) degree
Q (x) = a [0] + a [1] *x + a [2]*x2 + ……. + a[k]*x (k-1),   
D1, D2, D3….Dn, “n” number of shares are generated such that
D1 = Q (1), D2 = Q (2), D3 = Q (3)… Dn = Q (n).
A prime number “p” is selected such that “p>D” and “p>n”. The coefficients in 
the polynomial are chosen randomly from a uniform distribution over the range [0, p). In 
order to construct D (complete secret) from its shares (Di’s) that are shared by “n” 
number of entities at least “k” number of Di’s are required. The coefficients in the 
polynomial equation can be determined by using “k” number of Di’s. Using the 
coefficients, the secret (a [0]) can be determined. [12]
Some of the important features of this technique are:
 By fixing the threshold level (k), the number of Di pieces can be increased or 
decreased. Hence dynamic addition or deletion of the shareholders for the secret
is possible making it suitable for most of the applications. [12]
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 The size of each share (Di) can never exceed the size of the complete secret (D). 
[12]
3.6.2 Applications of Threshold Cryptography:
Threshold cryptography is very suitable for enhanced security purposes. It is mainly used 
for Digital certificates, in which a user is said to be authorized only if he possesses a valid 
digital certificate. To sign a digital certificate a secret key is required, which can be 
shared using “Threshold cryptography”. A value of “k” can be selected based on the 
number of entities that will always be present, under the assumption that most of them 
can be trusted.
Hence this concept is used in Ad hoc wireless networks to authorize a node to 
communicate in the network. Each node needs to get a certificate from the certification 
authority (CA). The number of nodes in a CA is the threshold, which is selected based on 
the number of neighbors each node has, most of the time. Hence each node in the CA has 
a part of the secret signature and when all of them agree to sign the certificate a new node 
is authorized to communicate in the network. The node receives pieces of the secret key
and when it receives “k” pieces it can construct a certificate. Threshold cryptography is 
very well suited for this application as the number of nodes on the network are not fixed 
and it works well under these situations as it enables dynamic addition or deletion of the  
shareholders for the secret. Threshold cryptography can also be used in public key 
cryptosystems.
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3.7 Intrusion Detection Systems:
The above cryptographic systems are mainly for the authentication of the entities in the 
network. If a particular authenticated entity starts behaving maliciously, there is no way 
for the entity to protect itself. For this purpose intrusion detection systems (IDS) are 
implemented. An Intrusion detection system is like a burglar alarm in the physical world. 
This will safeguard the node from any intrusions and attacks .The host node can take the 
required steps to reduce the effect of the attack. An intrusion detection system maintains 
a log of normal behavior. When the host entity communicates with any other entity it 
monitors the behavior of the target node. If the pattern of its behavior is different from 




TRUST PROBLEM IN AD HOC WIRELESS NETWORKS
4.1 Trust models:
Chapter 3 “Security in networks” emphasized the importance of security in a network. In 
order to ensure security in a wireless network each node in the network needs to be 
authenticated. Since, an ad hoc network has no infrastructure; a distributed trust model to 
authenticate the nodes in the network is required. The ad hoc network survives only by 
mutual cooperation among the nodes in the network, hence it is highly essential to have 
good trust relationships among the nodes in the network.
A trust model is said to be good, if it is able to handle as many threats as possible 
and if the underlying trust model is good enough to remove the malicious nodes in the 
network. A number of trust models have been proposed. This section gives an overview 
of those models.
Cr´epeau and Davis [13] proposed a trust mechanism where the nodes in the ad 
hoc network maintain profile tables which contain the details of the other nodes in the 
network including the nodes they have accused, and their behavior index. The behavior 
index is the measure of reputation of each node. If a node accuses a large number of 
nodes its behavior index or reputation is decreased, and as a result the other nodes don’t 
believe the accusations made by that node. Each time a node communicates it will check 
its own profile table with the profile tables of the other nodes and updates it. Each will 
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request the profile tables of the other nodes in the network and update its own table if 
there are any new entries. The nodes being accused and the date of accusation must be 
consistent in all the profile tables. If any inconstancies are discovered accusations are 
launched against those nodes. The model suggested by [13] establishes good trust 
relationships, but the process of exchanging profile tables each time may be time 
consuming. It should be done in real-time on the fly. The behavior index only handles 
hijacking nodes, the adversary model is not extensive and it is not specified how the 
nodes are authenticated and what is done with the mistrusted nodes.
 Capra proposes a model [14] where each node exchanges recommendation letters 
which describes the performance and satisfaction from the node in a specific context. 
This model emphasizes on context specific trust. Each node in the network communicates 
with other node by trusting a node blindly or if has any direct experience with it, it can 
also get recommendations from other nodes. At the end of communication the two nodes 
involved in the communication will exchange recommendation letters which describe 
their opinions on each other. The context of the trust is also specified in the 
recommendation letter. These letters are signed with the private key of the node issuing 
the recommendation. This is how the nodes built trust on each other, they initially 
communicate by trusting a node blindly later on they communicate based on their 
experience. When any node seeks recommendation about the performance of a particular 
node in the network the other nodes in the network pass on their recommendation which 
is also signed. After each communication the trust on the nodes is updated using a 
mathematical equation described in the paper. The trust formation, evolution and 
dissemination are all well described. Communication among the nodes is based on trust. 
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But, it’s not described how the model works under various threats; it’s all left to the fate 
of the node. Mistrusted nodes prevail in the network. 
According to Buchegger and Boudec [15] the trust relationships can be effectively 
established using a Bayesian network model. Each node has some reputation which 
increases or decreases based on its performance in the network. High preference is given 
to first hand observations than the second hand observations or the information obtained 
from other nodes. When ever an accusation against a particular node is received, each 
node marks it as a second hand experience and compares this with other nodes in the 
network by comparing its Bayesian network with the Bayesian networks of the other 
nodes; if the node finds any inconsistencies the reputation of the accusing node is 
lowered. If the reputation of the nodes is lowered below a threshold the node is said to be 
decided (or convicted). The model safeguards the nodes from rumors .This model only 
specifies how the reputation of the nodes is formed. It doesn’t have a good adversary 
model and doesn’t specify how the behavior of the node is estimated. 
The trust model by Anthony and Thompson [16] describes how the trust among 
the nodes is formed. Each node is classified under the following categories: 
compromised, unknown, Minimum, Medium, High, Highest (trust level).Each node picks 
a node to communicate based on the category. The nodes exchange the information in 
their local environment in regular intervals and update their information. This exchanging 
process is done only among the trusted nodes. Here each node has intrusion detection 
systems for detecting the threats, but the kind of threats that are handled has not been 
specified. It only mentions that the trust on misbehaving nodes has been reduced. The 
mechanism used for the authentication of the nodes in the network is not described.
28
In the model described by George and Baras [17] establishes a trust relationship 
among the nodes based on a theory of semirings.It is shown that two nodes can establish 
indirect trust relationships without direct interaction. The trust along the various paths of 
the network is evaluated, but how the good and bad nodes are isolated has not been 
mentioned.
Asad and Chris [18] proposed the trust model that is based on categories of trust; 
there are several categories that the model assumes they are passive acknowledgments, 
packet precision, gratuitous route replies, blacklists, salvaging information.
The trust on each node is developed as a result of interactions among the nodes, the trust 
is derivate based on the frames received, data packets forwarded, control packets
forwarded.
The following issues have not been addressed:
 Trust decay/consolidation over time
 security analysis of the model against attacks
 Trust acquirement through malicious behavior     
From the above discussion it is evident that each of the proposed approaches do not 
have a good adversary model or a good distributed trust model to authenticate the nodes 
in the network, They do not properly specify how the threats are handled and how the 
malicious node is handled. Hence, an effective trust model is required the model 
described in [19] is taken as the basis. The working of the model is explained in the next 
section. It is quite efficient but has several drawbacks which are examined. The major 
drawback is the trust relationships among the nodes. Hence a new trust model is proposed 
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in the next chapter which addresses all the problems faced by this model and serves as an 
effective solution for providing security in an ad hoc wireless network.
4.2 Distributed trust model:
This trust model is also called a “Trusted third party model”. In this trust model, a node 
can communicate only if it is authenticated by “k” nodes. These are trusted nodes and 
they together form the Certification authority (CA). Each of the “k” nodes in CA has a 
part of the secret key for signing the digital certificates. When a node is new to the 
network it floods a certificate request message. When the “k” nodes see this, each one 
signs the certificate with the part of the secret key that it carries. Once all the “k” nodes 
sign, the certificate is complete. Hence the new node can start communicating. Here there 
are two important factors Tcert and k. Tcert is the time for which the certificate is valid.
After this Tcert period of time, the node has to renew its certificate to continue 
communicating in the network. The value “k” is the number of nodes in the CA that can 
be decided in two different ways. In the first method, the value k is a fixed number. This 
method may not be very good, as there may not be “k” number of nodes at all times in the 
network. In the second method, the value of k is selected based on the majority, i.e. based 
on the number of nodes each one has in its neighborhood. This trust model will be 
referred as scheme1 in the entire document.
4.3 Dynamic Coalescing: 
In this method when a node wants to get a certificate, it waits for a reply from “k” nodes. 
If it doesn’t get enough replies, it can move from its position and can get reply from the 
nodes over there. Normally the certificate is requested from the neighboring nodes i.e.
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one-hop neighbors. If enough number of nodes is not present, then certificates can be 
requested from the next hop neighbor, which is called “Dynamic coalescing”. 
When the certificate of a node is to be renewed, it is issued based on its behavior and is 
recorded in a table by each node in the network. [19]
4.4 Trust Model:
Each node maintains a table which looks as shown below: 
Table 1:  Certificate revocation list maintained by each node
If the number of accusers is at least k (no of nodes in the CA), then the node is marked as 
convicted If the number of accusers is less than k, then it is marked as a suspect.
Whenever a node observes that a particular node in its neighborhood is misbehaving, it will 
mark the node as convicted. When it sees this kind of a behavior, it will flood the message so 
that, other nodes in the network will make a change in their tables. The certificate is not 
issued to the convicted nodes.Hence, with the help of the above scheme we can ensure that 
only legitimate nodes exist in the network and any node that tries to misbehave will not have 
its certificate renewed.
Node ID List of  Accusers Comments




1. The certificate revocation is not stopped until k nodes issue a convicted message. So 
until there are “k” entries in the list of accusers, the misbehaving node manages to get 
a certificate potentially inflicting considerable damage to the network.
2. There is no trust among the nodes i.e. if any particular node tries to misbehave, it 
deliberately floods information (that a particular node is not good) to other nodes and 
they make the corresponding entry in the table. No measure is taken to accept 
messages only from trusted nodes. There can be a problem here; an innocent node 
might be denied a certificate.
3. There can be certain nodes, which try to disturb the network just by issuing messages 
on the misbehavior of a particular node. No measure is taken to avoid hearing such 
possibly false malicious accusations. There should be a mechanism to differentiate 
the legitimate messages from malicious messages.
4. The nodes that try to misbehave (or those with malicious intentions) may create a 
slow and steady impact on the network i.e. they would behave well initially then 
slowly start causing availability problems or reducing the quality of transmission. 
This model has no parameter to measure trust based on availability or quality of 
transmission.
5. Here all the messages a node receives is a flooded message, so if it fails to receive the 
message, it will lose that valid information. This can lead to certificate renewal for a 
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malicious node. In this scheme, a node doesn’t seek recommendations on the 
performance of other nodes; it just listens to the flooded messages.
The trust on a particular node is a learning process and each and every interaction with a 
node should be weighted to track the behavior of the node. The above cannot be achieved 
with the trust model described above.
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CHAPTER V
    TRUST
5.1 Introduction:
In the trust model described earlier, there was no trust in the relationship among the 
nodes in the network. The communication was carried without any trust being 
established. This could be highly risky, especially when the transactions are critical.
If there is trust among the nodes in the network, the risk factor is considerable reduced, as 
nodes in the network communicate only with other trusted nodes. This minimizes the 
chances of being compromised or becoming vulnerable to attacks. Hence Trust is very 
critical, and is one of the important attributes in ad hoc networks.
5.2 Definition of Trust:
There is no precise definition for trust. Trusting is nothing but relying on some thing or 
somebody believing that it is legitimate in providing service, maintaining confidentiality 
of information, making correct use of available resources and keeping up the
expectations. In other words, the main reason for having trust is to keep up good security.
Hence Trust can be something that addresses the three important attributes of security 
namely, availability, confidentiality and integrity. While availability means the time for 
which a system will be available for use, integrity defines how reliable the 
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Information on the system is and confidentiality defines how well the information is 
protected from unauthorized access. [20]
5.3 Types of Trust:
 There are various types of trust. They are as follows:
 Self Trust: Self trust is the trust in oneself or trust within the system.
 Direct Trust: It is the trust between two nodes, which is formed by direct 
experience.
 Third party Trust: A trusted node will take the responsibility for the formation 
of trust between two entities. The trust formed should be verifiable by the node 
relying on the trusted third party.  
 Proxy Trust: It is a kind of trust that is formed based on a recommendation from 
another trusted node. [21]
5.4 Prevalence of Trust:
Trust is present everywhere in the world, starting from our daily routine to forming 
alliances among nations; trust is the foundation of any relationship in the world.
 We would normally prefer to buy a product of a well known company to a new one and 
we would like to go to a movie of a popular star rather than of a debutant. But, the extent 
to which trust is required is important, since in every step that we take there is 
considerable risk involved. For trivial things like buying a coffee or going to a movie,
trust doesn’t play a role. But in transactions involving money, trust is required .Therefore, 
in the case of ad hoc networks, if a node talks to an unknown node, there is some amount 
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of risk based on the kind of transaction. If the transaction is very trivial, then the node can 
communicate with any node as there is no risk, but highly confidential transaction should 
take place only when good amount of trust is present, since confidentiality and integrity 
of the system is important. Moreover if the communications with mistrusted parties take
place, there is a risk of being hijacked and compromised. From the above discussion it is 
evident that prevalence of trust is required for any transaction. However, the extent of 
trust required will be based on the amount of risk involved. As trust is very important, it 
is vital to understand the nature of trust.
5.5 Nature of Trust:
Trust is subjective, which means that each individual has a different perception of trust. 
This means that, if one trusts a company for timely transactions, another might trust it for 
the quality of production. Therefore the trust of the two individuals may conflict. 
As trust is multifaceted, the context of trust is very important. 
By introducing trust in ad hoc wireless networks, each node in the network will 
communicate with a node that it trusts. As trust can be multifaceted, trust of one node in 
other will be based on a specific context. For example if node A trusts node B for a good 
quality of service, it could mistrust it for availability. When a node is new to the network 
all the other nodes in the network are new to it. Hence there is no node that it trusts. 
Under such situations, it can ask for recommendations from other nodes. After the 
communication takes place, if the node that asked for recommendations finds the 
communication satisfactory, then its trust on the recommenders that recommended 




6.1 Trust management framework:
The task of the trust management framework is accomplished with the help of Bayesian 
Networks. Consider an ad hoc network shown in Figure 8:
        L               A
   J           
 B                          
    W                    K
   Z            
                          R                      M
Figure 8: A sample ad hoc network
          The above illustrates a set of nodes in an ad hoc network. In this network, when a 
new node enters the network, it requests a certificate from the certification authority. No 
node in the network can communicate without the certificate and the certificate is valid 
only for a specified period of time. All the basic steps in this model are the same as the 
trust model described in chapter 4.The special feature of this scheme is the introduction 
of trust in the model.
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Any node in the network will communicate, if it has trust in the target node. Trust is built 
on each node in two ways, one is by direct experience and the other is through 
recommendations. 
Furthermore, there can be parameters (i.e. context of trust) which influence the 
trust on the nodes. When any node gets a request for certificate renewal, it will be 
renewed only if the node is trustworthy. Every node has trust values for every other node 
in the network, if the trust value is greater than or equal to a threshold the node is trusted. 
For enhanced security of the nodes there is an Intrusion detection unit in each node for 
checking any attacks that may take place when it is communicating with another node. . 
When an Intrusion is detected, it signals the source node and the source immediately 
ceases communication and reduces its trust on the target node with which it is 
communicating.
The behavior of the target node may be perfectly legal and benign.  However, due 
to interference or some other problems it may be suspected to be malicious. The source 
node therefore cannot take any strong decision as to if it is malicious and flood an 
accusation message that it is suspicious. This is because the main objective of this 
scheme is that “no innocent node should suffer and no bad node should survive”. Hence 
unless the target’s behavior is very obvious for it to be marked as malicious, the source 
node doesn’t flood any message against it. However, as it is suspecting it to be bad, it will 
reduce the trust on the target node. For accomplishing a secured network of this kind, we 
propose to implement the trust as Bayesian networks.
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6.2 Motivation:
A Bayesian network is a relationship network that uses statistical methods to represent 
probability relationships between different nodes.
The main reasons for using Bayesian network are as follows:
A Bayesian network works with probability. Trust can be best represented using 
probability. This is because although it may not be possible to represent the trust between 
two nodes with absolute certainty, a probability measure of trust can be derived. In this 
scheme, an assumption of different contexts is made, hence when two agents are 
exchanging their opinions on a particular node there may be conflicts, if the contexts are 
different. The other reason for using Bayesian network is that the network learns from 
experience, the trust values get updated with each communication.
If the two parameters of trust are Availability and Quality of service and if a node 
wants to find out if a particular node is good at quality and also good at availability, these 
are the two contexts of trust. So combining both of them would be difficult. In such a 
scenario a Bayesian network would make things easy.





P (h) is called the prior probability of hypothesis and p (e) is the prior probability of evidence 
P (h/e) is the probability of h given e; P (e/h) is the probability of e given h.
Hence when all the values are supplied (i.e. prior probabilities) the Bayes theorem computes 
the posterior probability.
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6.3 Working mechanism of the model:
A node in the ad hoc network has three different functions:
Figure 9: Flowchart describing the functions of a node
 Communicating: A node in the network communicates with other nodes based 
on trust.
 Seek & send recommendations: When a node wants to communicate with a 
node of which if it has no direct experience or if it has little or outdated 
experience it will seek recommendations from other nodes in the network. It will 
also send recommendation if it receives any requests for the same from other 
nodes in the network.
 Revokes & requests Certificates: Any node in the network can communicate 
only for the period the certificate is valid. After that, it needs to be renewed. 
Hence it sends a request for certificate and if a threshold of nodes replies to the 
request, it can then form its certificate. It also has to revoke a certificate if it 
receives a request .A certificate is revoked only if the node is trust worthy.








6.4 Communication of the node: 
Before understanding the details of a node’s communication, it is important to understand 
the local environment (i.e. information that a node maintains) of a node.
For the sake of building trust on each node in the network, each node maintains a 
Bayesian network for every other node in the network. 
Figure 10: Bayesian Network model
The two parameters of trust are:
1. Availability: This describes how long the target node is available for service, an 
important attribute of security.
2. Quality of service: The meaning is quite in evident that it describes the quality of 
service of the target node. This is also a very important parameter of trust. This is because 
if the quality of service is poor, there is wastage of communication and also excessive 
loss of battery power that is very scarce and needs to be conserved in an ad hoc network.
       Satisfaction
   Availability Quality of service
Trust
41
Again as described earlier each node has it own perception of trust; hence each 
node is free to give its own weight for the two parameters. The weight could be any value 
between [0, 1].
Once a node communicates it records the target nodes performance and calculates 
satisfaction using the following mathematical expression:
AAQQ SWSWSonsatisfacti **)( += eq. (1)
Where
WQ:  weight for Quality of transmission
 SQ:  Satisfaction from the Quality of transmission
WA:  weight for availability
 SA: Satisfaction from availability
If this value is greater than or equal to threshold then the node is trustworthy. 
Satisfaction is nothing but the trust on the node. All this information is stored in the local 
environment of the node.
6.5 Local environment of a node:
Trust can be stored only if the node has a direct experience. If it has no direct experience 
it can seek for recommendations, hence a node in an ad hoc network acts as a service 
provider as well as a recommender. Therefore two Bayesian networks are needed for a 
single node, one to represent its trustworthiness as service provider and the other as a 
recommender. This is illustrated in Figure11.
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Figure 11:  Local environment of a node in an ad hoc network
It is important to note the devices that operate in an ad hoc network are battery 
constrained and we therefore cannot always make an assumption that when a request is 
sent, it will receive a reply. Usually nodes in the network can be selfish. In order to save 
their battery power they may not respond to all the requests that they receive.
Hence taking this into consideration there may be a situation, where a node is unable to 
form a good trust level on a particular node in the network even though the node may not 
be untrustworthy. Hence to overcome such a situation, the following is done. When two 
nodes are communicating in the network, at the end of the communication, they exchange 
a “portfolio of credentials” which means that each node will receive a recommendation 
letter from the node it has communicated, which will be as follows:





Trust as a service
Provider
Intrusion Detection Unit
 Check for Dos attacks
   Excessive time delay
    Spoofing attack
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<a, b, c, t> which means that “a” trust’s “b”  in the context c and at a time stamp t. [14]
This letter will be signed by the private key of the recommender, so that any node will 
not make fake portfolios. Hence when a node encounters a situation where very few 
number of nodes reply when it seeks for recommendation, it would request the target 
node for its portfolios and make a decision based on the portfolios it receives. For 
security reasons, when any node sends a recommendation in the network, it should be 
signed by its private key to avoid repudiation.
6.6 Intrusion detection unit:
Intrusion detection systems are security systems just like burglar alarms in the physical 
world. They keep a close eye on the network, and watch for abnormal activities on the 
network. It has a pattern of normal behavior, so whenever an activity takes place, it 
matches the pattern to its database and if it finds any deviation, it alarms. Intrusion 
detection systems are now becoming very popular security mechanisms. The Intrusion 
detection unit is added to each node in the network as an extension to Scheme 1 for 
enhanced security in the ad hoc wireless network. [22]
The intrusion detection unit checks for 3 attacks:
 DOS attack
 Excessive time delays
 Spoofing Attack
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1. Large no of continuous requests (DoS attack):
There is a threshold on the number of requests a node sends. Once the threshold is 
exceeded, the intrusion detection unit will alarm. The assumption here is that when any 
two nodes are communicating in the network, if any of the two nodes sends a 
recommendation letter (the letter that is to be issued at the end of the communication), the 
other node should stop sending messages and understand that the communication has
ended thereby the trust on the misbehaving node will be reduced. Although this may not 
stop the node from sending more messages, it will know that the other node has reduced 
its trust level for the node.
2. Time of response:
There should be a minimum waiting time for a response, when two nodes are 
communicating and if one of the nodes takes an unexpectedly long time to reply then the 
Intrusion detection unit will beep and communication will end. That node might 
purposefully try to delay communication to conserve battery power for low priority
communication or the delay may be due to network congestion. Irrespective of whether 
the node purposely or otherwise reduces communication, trust is decreased for the node.
3. Spoofing:
 In a spoofing attack when two n odes are communicating, one of the nodes may change 
the source IP address field in the IP packet. [23]. When the communication ends, the 
nodes have to exchange recommendation letters, which need to be signed by the private 
keys. When the Intrusion detection unit finds from the signature that spoofing has 
occurred, it alarms and the trust on the node is reduced and an accusation message is 
flooded in the network. Once such a message is flooded, the source node marks the target 
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node as convicted in the comments field of the corresponding node ID in its local 
environment.
6.7 Communication of a node under different scenarios:
There are three different scenarios of communication with another node:
1. When there is direct experience with the other node
2. When there is no direct experience or if the node doesn’t have enough information to 
make a decision
3. When nodes are selfish and very few nodes respond to the request for recommendation
When a node wants to talk to a node, it should have some kind of trust on it. Otherwise, it 
can’t communicate, as it doesn’t want to end up in wasting its resources doing a useless 
communication. Hence, if the node had ever communicated with the target directly it will 
have some kind of Trust on it. If it had no direct experiences, it will seek for 
recommendations from the rest of the nodes in the network.
1. Direct experience:
When a node has some direct experience with the target, it measures the performance of 
the target and the amount of satisfaction it gets after communicating with it, by using its 
own weight for the parameters as stored in the local environment. If the trust level is 
greater than or equal to threshold then it communicates, else it picks up some other node 
and repeats the same step. An important factor is the time of the experience with the other 
node. If it is outdated, it has to neglect its experience and seek for recommendations 
(explained below) that are fresher. At the end of the communication both the nodes 
exchange a portfolio of credentials.
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2. Absence of Direct Experience:
When there is no direct experience a node seeks recommendations from other nodes.
Different nodes in the network might respond to such queries, out of which some nodes 
could be already known nodes (the nodes with which the host node communicated and 
has trust values for the nodes), some of which, are trusted nodes and some are mistrusted 
nodes. The, recommendations from known (trusted nodes) are given more weight out of 
which the more recent information is given more weight. The latest information from 
unknown nodes is given less weight.
Once these recommendations are taken, a decision is taken whether
communication can proceed or not. Once the communication is complete, the nodes 
exchange recommendation letters. On completion if the communication was satisfactory 
the trust on the nodes that recommended positive is increased and for the others it is 
decreased.
3. Handling Selfish nodes:
When a node doesn’t have a direct experience or if the trust values are outdated it seeks 
recommendations from other nodes. Some of these nodes may not respond to the requests 
if they are selfish in view of saving their battery power. Under such situations the 
following is done: The node wishing to communicate can ask the target node for 
recommendation letters that it has got so far, in order to decide whether it can 
communicate with it. Then the source verifies the time stamp of the recommendation 
letter, and also the source of the letter and if the source is trust worthy, then it calculates 
the trust. If it is greater than or equal to the threshold, the source can communicate.
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Figure 12:  Flowchart for a node communicating in a trust environment
6.8 Sending & seeking recommendations:
In an ad hoc network at any point of time, a node may have to request for 
recommendations on a particular node or it may have to send a recommendation. Each 
node maintains the following table in its local environment
No  of InteractionsNode Id Availability Quality of 
Transmission  Total Sa Sq Si
Satisfaction Trust Time 
stamp
A 20% 80%   3 1 1 1 0.35   0 20 sec
B 100% 90%   5 5 5 5 0.95   1 40 sec
Table 2: A table in the node’s local environment
     Node
  Local Environment




Is the node 
trustworthy?




The time stamp indicates the time with respect to the time the certificate was issued. 20 
seconds implies 20 seconds after the certificate was issued.
Sa- No of interactions in which the availability was satisfactory
Sq- No of interactions in which the Qos was satisfactory
Si- No of interactions that was satisfactory
Satisfaction is calculated using the formula described earlier
AAQQ SWSWSonsatisfacti **)( +=
Where
WQ:   weight for quality of transmission
 SQ:   Satisfaction from the quality of transmission
WA:   weight for availability
 SA   : Satisfaction from availability
If satisfaction is greater than or equal to threshold St Then the trust is set to 1 
otherwise it is 0, a node will communicate with a node whose trust is non-zero.
Each node does the following calculation when it has to send the recommendation.
Conditional probability is used to find the satisfaction from availability.
This is represented as follows:
P ( Attribute=”Availability” /T=1) = P ( Attribute=”Availability”, T=1)/ P (T=1) eq. (2) 
Where
P (T=1) = m/n
P ( Attribute=”Availability”, T=1): no of interactions in which the attribute availability was 
satisfactory.
m: no of satisfying interactions
 n: total no of interactions
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The same is done for quality of service
 P ( Attribute=”QOS” /T=1)   = P ( Attribute=”QOS”, T=1)/ P (T=1) eq. (3)
P (T=1) = m/n
Where
P ( Attribute=”QOS”, T=1): no of interactions in which the attribute QOS was satisfactory
m: no of satisfying interactions
n: total no of interactions
When the recommendations are sent, a trust value is sent, which is the probability that the 
node provides good availability and is trustworthy in providing quality of service.
Mathematically,
P (T=1/ Attribute=”Availability”)   and P (T=1/ Attribute=”QOS”) needs to be calculated 





P (h): No of availability or Qos cases satisfying / total no of interactions
P (e): No of Satisfying interactions/ Total no of interactions
P (e/h) is obtained form equation 2 or 3
This value is sent by the node as a recommendation, the timestamp of the 
observation is also sent. The recommendation letter is signed by the private key of the 
node issuing the certificate. This is called “Trust Dissemination”.

























































*  [24]     eq. (4)
Where
rij  =   the total recommendation value for the j
th node that ith node has
k= no of trustworthy references
g= no of unknown references
tril = the trust that i
th node has on lth recommender
trlj = the trust that l
th node has on j th node
tzj = The trust that z
th unknown node  has on jth node 
wt1 = weight given to known references (latest)
ws1 = weight given to unknown references (latest)
wt2 = weight given to known references (old)
ws2= weight given to unknown references (old)
More weight is given to trusted reference and then to unknown references in which fresh 
recommendations are given more weight then old ones
                                wt1   +   ws1    + wt2   +   ws2    =1  
                    wt1 > wt2,   ws1 > ws2
                               Where wt1, wt2  >    ws1, ws2    
This is done twice once for availability and then for quality of service.
Then satisfaction is calculated and if it is greater than or equal to threshold communication 
takes place.
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This is called “Trust Formation.” After the communication takes place, the trust on the 
recommenders needs to be updated and the trust on the target node needs to be updated as a 
service provider. This is called “Trust evolution”, which is done using the following formula
ααα etrtr oijnij *)1(* −+= [25]    eq. (5)
Where
trij
n = new trust value that the ith agent has in the jth reference after the update 
trij
o =denotes the old trust value.
α     = learning rate – a real number in the interval [0, 1].
e α is the new evidence value, which can be -1 or 1. If the value of recommendation is
greater than threshold and the interaction with the node was satisfying, e α is
Equal to 1 otherwise it is -1.
                                                Contacts         
                                                                       No                                                           
                                              Yes
Figure 13: Flowchart describing how a node sends recommendations
       Node 
   Local Environment
 Sends signed 
 Recommendation
 Have direct    
experience?     Doesn’t reply
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6.9 Certificate Revocation: 
In the ad hoc network each node communicates only for the period the certificate is valid, 
once the certificate expires, it has to be renewed.  It should get a reply from at least k 
(threshold) nodes to continue its communication in the network.
When a node receives a request for certificate renewal the procedure as shown in Figure 14 is 
adopted.
       Contacts
                                                                              No
           Yes
Figure 14: Flow chart describing certificate revocation
      Node 
  Ask for 
Recommendation 
letters
Trustworthy     Certificate is not issued
   Certificate is issued
     Local Environment
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When a certificate is to be renewed a node requests the other nodes to renew the 
certificate. The requested nodes reply to the requesting node with a request for a “Portfolio of 
credentials”. This “Portfolio of credentials” determines the overall behavior of the node in 
the network during a certificate validity period.
Suppose if A’s certificate needs to be renewed, it sends its request to all the other 
nodes then the node J on receiving its request, requests for all the recommendation letters
 A has got. J gives more importance to the fresh ones. It adds up all the trust values, if the 
trust is greater than or equal to threshold, then certificate can be given. J gives a partial 
certificate to A. A sends similar request to other nodes in the network, if it is able to get k 
or more partial certificate it can form a valid certificate to communicate in the network. 
Some times the node may have one or no recommendation, as it has not participated in 
communication. In this case the host node checks its local environment to verify if there 
is any information about the target nodes misbehavior. If the node has misbehaved 




The objective of the simulation is to compare the proposed Bayesian Trust model for 
certificate revocation with the approach described in [19]. The simulation will aim to 
show that as trust is gradually built up in the proposed model, fewer innocent nodes will 
have their certificate revoked and more malicious nodes will have their certificates 
revoked compared to the approach taken in [19]. The simulation for this work is 
performed in the ‘C’ programming language on Microsoft.Net platform. The complete 
source code is listed in the Appendix. An ad hoc network with nodes moving at random 
speeds and directions is simulated using the Random waypoint mobility model. 




Availability and Quality of service parameters are included in the simulation. The 
performance of the proposed scheme and the scheme described in chapter 4 are compare 
under the influence of attacks. In particular the following comparison is made for the two 
approaches:
 The time taken to remove a malicious node from the network 
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 The number of innocent nodes suffered by the policies used 
 The amount of useful communication performed by the network the useful 
communication is limited by the certificate availability, quality of service and 
availability of the nodes in communication.
The proposed scheme and the scheme described by [19] are implemented separately 
under the same environment and the performance is compared.
The rest of this chapter gives an in-depth description of the simulation and the 
comparison of the two schemes. 
7.1 Ad hoc network model:
For our simulation purposes, the ad hoc network model consists of a mixture of genuine 
and malicious nodes. Each node in the network has a unique ID. The nodes are placed at 
random positions in the simulation area. As this simulation deals with certificate 
revocation lists, the nodes in the network are assumed to have entered the network and 
have acquired a certificate for communication. Each node has a destination to reach, and 
each node is allocated some random traveling time and speed. Once a node reaches a 
position at the end of its travel time, it will pause for some time and this is called the 
pause time of the node, during which the node communicates with the other nodes or 
requests a certificate renewal, floods accusations etc. Each node has its own random 
pause time. The threshold value ‘K’ is globally fixed. The transmission range of the 
nodes is also globally determined. Each node has its own file to transfer the size is chosen 
randomly and every node is assigned a random download speed.
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When two nodes communicate, the initiator of the communication will try to 
transfer a file which is received by the destination. The file size transferred will be based 
upon the pause time, download speed, certificate validity of the nodes in communication. 
Hence, each node is also assigned a file to transfer at a particular download speed. When 
a node wishes to communicate with a particular node in the network, it has to send a 
request to the node and wait for the reply, where each node has its own reply time. The 
simulation is characterized by a cycle of communication, which means that each node in 
the network is given a chance to travel to a new position .After reaching a position it can 
flood accusations or based upon its certificate validity it will communicate with other 
nodes in the network. If the certificate has expired it will send request for renewal of the 
certificate. These sequences of events constitute a cycle of communication. The 
simulation is repeated for a number of cycles of communication to analyze its 
performance.
 The network model remains the same for the simulation of the two schemes except for 
some additional parameters used in the simulation of the Bayesian network trust model. 
They are as follows:
 Each node has its own weight for the two parameters of trust (availability, quality 
of service).
 The threshold for satisfaction from a node (this is globally fixed).
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7.2 Implementation of a distributed trust model:
The following steps describe the implementation of the trust model described in [19].
1. Initially, each node in the network travels to a random position in the simulation 
area based on its speed and time of travel. After reaching a destination, the node 
scans for its neighbors or surrounding nodes. Only the nodes that are within the 
transmission range of the node are assumed to be the neighbors of the node. 
Hence, every node will maintain a list of its neighbors each time it reaches a new 
position.
2. Each node has a destination to reach. Once it reaches its destination it picks up a 
new destination.
3. The node will monitor its surroundings to check if there is any malicious activity 
taking place. If it observes any such activity it will flood accusations to all its 
neighbors (these are one-hop neighbors). Each node maintains a “Certificate 
Revocation List” In the list it maintains a record of accusers who accused each 
node. When the no of accusers is at least k the node is marked as convicted 
otherwise it is marked as a suspect. These are called comments in the CRL. This 
is done in the CRL of the accuser as well as its neighbors. If the accused node has 
accused some other nodes in the past, all those entries are cleared and the 
comment on each node is updated.
4. The node selects a nearest neighbor to communicate. Once the neighbor is chosen 
it will wait for a reply from it. Once it gets a reply it will start sending the file that 
it wants to transfer. The file transfer will continue as long as the certificates of the 
two nodes are valid. Suppose if  ’A’ is communicating with ‘B’, ‘B’ can receive 
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the file only for the time the certificate of ’A’ is valid; similarly ’A’ can send a 
file to ‘B’ as long as ‘B’ has a valid certificate. This is again dependent on pause 
time; the pause time of the nodes cannot be greater than their certificate validity 
periods. 
5. Based on the above factors the useful communication performed is calculated as 
follows:
Actual file transfer: The actual file size that node ’A’ is capable of transferring is 
based on its certificate validity period and pause time.
      File transfer performed: The file size that ‘A’ is able to send is calculated as 
       Time for communication* download speed of the receiver.
The time for communication is based on the pause time of the receiver which 
cannot be greater than its certificate validity. 
File transfer performed = Time for communication* download speed of the 
receiver. 
This file transfer performed by the next set of communicating nodes is added to 
this value.
Actual file transfer: Pause time of ‘A’* Download speed of ‘A’
From these two factors (list the factors) the percentage of useful communication is 
calculated. Percentage of useful communication = File transfer performed / Actual 
file transfer *100. 
6. If a node has no neighbor to communicate it will not perform any file transfer. It 
will wait for the next cycle of communication during which it can move to a new 
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position in the search of new neighbors to communicate. If it still doesn’t have 
any neighbors it will continue to move to a new position.
7. When node ‘A’ picks up its nearest neighbor, it has no special factors for making 
its choice except for the distance; it doesn’t have any kind of intrusion detection 
system to judge the target node. Hence if the receiving node is a DoS attacking 
node it will perform a DoS attack on A. Consequently, A cannot respond to any 
requests from other nodes and the node A will continue to be under the DoS 
attack as long as it is in the proximity of the attacker. A node under a DoS attack 
cannot communicate and this will affect the percentage of useful communication 
in the network.
8. When a node tries to communicate with a DoS attacked node it will not get a 
reply from it. Hence, for the entire pause time the node will be waiting for the 
reply from the target node. This will affect the percentage of useful 
communication
9.  Hijacking attack: In this kind of an attack, a malicious node chooses a victim to 
falsely accuse in order to remove it from the network, so it compromises the node 
with which it communicates together the compromised node and the malicious 
node accuse an innocent node. The Hijacking node repeats this until the victim is 
removed from the network. This kind of an attack is common in the networks 
where the threshold value k is fixed. If the Hijacking node can compromise k 
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nodes it can successfully remove the victim from the network. Even if the value 
of k is dynamic it is not difficult for a node in the network to determine it.
Every node maintains a record of all the nodes it has accused and the reason for 
accusing. The intrusion detection unit before every cycle of communication 
checks the list. If for any accused node there is no reason listed then the intrusion 
detection unit assumes that the host node was compromised by the previous node 
with which it had communicated. Hence the source node floods accusation against 
the hijacker.
10. There are many other malicious activities like spoofing, time delay attacks where 
the target node purposely provides low quality of service. These attacks are 
undetected in this trust model.
11. A node can communicate in the network only if it has a valid certificate. If the 
certificate expires, the node floods a request for certificate renewal to its one hop 
neighbors. The neighbors who receive the request will check if the requesting 
node is convicted or not and if it is not convicted they reply otherwise they do not 
reply. The requesting node will collect all the replies and if the replies are at least 
k, it forms a certificate otherwise it is removed from the network. If a node 




 The memory requirements are not very high, since each node maintains only its 
list of neighbors and a certificate revocation list.
 Each node picks a node to communicate based on the distance. Hence, much of 
the computational capacity of a node is not utilized.
 Due to the above two reasons the battery usage is not very high.
7.2.2 Shortcomings:
 There is no trust relationship among the nodes. Each node accepts a flooded 
message from any other node in the network. Due to this, a large no of innocent 
nodes could be removed from the network due to wrong accusations against them.
 Each node in the network is not equipped with an Intrusion detection mechanism 
to protect itself from DoS attacks, spoofing or time delay attacks.
 The trust model has no mechanism to remove the DoS attacking nodes and 
hijacking nodes. They are removed only if any hijacking node hijacks DoS 
attacking node or another hijacking node. Hence, the malicious nodes are 
removed by a chance of luck.
 The attacks like spoofing, time delay are undetected by the trust model.
 Unless k nodes realize that a node is bad , it is not removed from the network, this 
delay can cause considerable damage to the network
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7.3 Implementation of a Bayesian network trust model:
The following steps describe the implementation of the Bayesian network trust model:
1. Initially, each node in the network travels to a random position in the simulation 
area based on its speed and time of travel. After reaching a destination, the node 
scans for its neighbors or surrounding nodes and only the nodes that are within the 
transmission range of the node are assumed to be the neighbors of the node. 
Hence, every node will maintain a list of its neighbors each time it reaches a new 
position.
2. Each node has a destination, once it reaches its destination it picks up a new 
destination.
3. Each node maintains a table of information about its neighbors. The table has 
several fields namely, the no of interactions among the nodes, no of interactions 
in which the availability was satisfying, interactions in which the quality of 
service was satisfying, total satisfaction from the node, trust on that node and 
comments, satisfaction as a recommender. The comments field is used to make an 
entry if there are any accusations against it. The time stamp of the latest 
experience is also recorded.
4. Each node in the network communicates based on trust, which means that a node 
will communicate with a node in the network only if it has some measure of trust 
on it. Suppose if a node wants to communicate with a mistrusted node it will get 
an opinion from a set of nodes that it trusts. If they trust the node, this node will 
also trust the node. At initialization, during the first cycle of communication each 
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node is assigned some trust on its neighbors.  This is purely for startup as the 
nodes communicate based on trust.
5. After the two nodes communicate, they exchange their opinions on each other 
using recommendation letters which describe their trust and satisfaction with each 
other. The timestamp is also recorded and the recommendation letter is signed by 
the private key of the node.
6. During the communication the node will monitor its surroundings to check if 
there is any malicious activity taking place by sensing the routes of 
communication in the network. If it observes any such activity it will flood 
accusations to all its neighbors (these are one-hop neighbors). 
When accusations are flooded in the network, a node will believe the message if it 
trusts the accusing node, otherwise it ignores the message. If it trusts the message 
it marks the accused node as convicted.
7. When a node wants to communicate, it selects up the node that it trusts the best. 
The selection is based upon the weight the node gives for availability and quality 
of service .Hence the node tries to pick a node that has the best value for the 
required parameter. Then the satisfaction is computed using the equation1 
described in chapter 6. If the satisfaction is greater than or equal to threshold (a 
global parameter) then the node checks if the target node is convicted. If it is 
convicted it will select the next best node and checks if there has been any direct 
experience. If the experience is outdated or if there is no experience, the node will 
seek recommendations. Then it will evaluate trust based on the equation 1 
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described in chapter 6 and if the trust is within the threshold value the node 
communicates otherwise it will pickup another node for communication.
8. There could be a situation where a node may not get enough recommendations, if 
the nodes are selfish and they want to save their battery power. Under such 
situations when there are less then the threshold of k replies, the node requests the 
target node for the recommendation letters it has got and based on those 
recommendation letters the node will decide whether to communicate with the 
target node or not.
9. When a node receives a request for recommendation about a node it will decide 
whether or not to reply, if it wants to reply it will check if it has any direct 
experience with the node and if there is direct experience it will send its 
recommendation signed by its private key to avoid non-repudiation.
10. When a node communicates based on the recommendations that it has obtained 
from the other nodes, it has to update its trust on the recommenders based on the 
satisfaction from the communication. If the communication was satisfying the 
trust on the positive recommenders is increased, while the trust on the negative 
recommenders is decreased and vice versa. This is done by using the trust 
evolution equation 5 described in chapter 6 
11. Once the neighbor is chosen for communication, the node will wait for a reply 
from it. On getting the reply it will start sending the file that it wants to transfer. 
The file transfer will continue as long as the certificates of the two nodes are 
valid. Suppose if  ’A’ is communicating with ‘B’, ‘B’ can receive the file only 
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until the time the certificate of ’A’ is valid, similarly ’A’ can send file to ‘B’ as 
long as ‘B’ has a valid certificate. This is again dependent on pause time; the 
pause time of the nodes cannot be greater than their certificate validity periods. 
12. Based on the above factors the useful communication performed is calculated as 
follows:
Actual file transfer: The actual file size that node ’A’ is capable of transferring is 
based on its certificate validity period and pause time.
      File transfer performed: The file size that ‘A’ is able to send is calculated as 
       Time for communication* download speed of the receiver.
The time for communication is based on the pause time of the receiver which 
cannot be greater than its certificate validity. 
File transfer performed = Time for communication* download speed of the 
receiver. 
This file transfer performed by the next set of communicating nodes is added to 
this value.
Actual file transfer: Pause time of ‘A’* Download speed of ‘A’
From these two factors (list the factors) the percentage of useful communication is 
calculated.
 Percentage of useful communication = File transfer performed / Actual file 
transfer *100.
 Each node keeps track of the number of requests it receives during 
communication and if the no of requests exceed a threshold of requests, then the 
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intrusion detection system of the host node will signal a DoS attack .As a result, 
the node will flood an accusation in the network. This is how DoS attacking nodes 
are handled.
13. Hijacking attacks: In this kind of an attack, a malicious node chooses a victim to 
falsely accuse in order to remove it from the network, so it compromises the node 
with which it communicates together the compromised node and the malicious 
node accuse an innocent node. The Hijacking node repeats this until the victim is 
removed from the network. This kind of an attack is common in the networks 
where the threshold value k is fixed. If the Hijacking node can compromise k 
nodes it can successfully remove the victim from the network. Even if the value 
of k is dynamic it is not difficult for a node in the network to determine it.
14.  Every node maintains a record of all the nodes it has accused and the reason for 
accusing. The intrusion detection unit before every cycle of communication 
checks the list. If for any accused node there is no reason listed then the intrusion 
detection unit assumes that the host node was compromised by the previous node 
with which it had communicated. Hence the source node floods accusation against 
the hijacker. Each node will make a note of the nodes that it has accused and the 
reason for accusation. The reasons can be a DoS attack, spoofing, or a message 
from a trusted node. The node with which it communicated in that cycle of 
communication is also noted. No entry is made if a node is accused as a result of 
being compromised by a hijacking node. Hence it will accuse the node with which 
it had previously communicated. 
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15. A node attempting a spoofing attack changes its ID during communication, so the 
other node believes it is communicating with a different node. But, at the end of 
communication the nodes exchange signed recommendation letters and when the 
opposite node discovers that the signature of the source node doesn’t match its ID, 
the intrusion detection unit signals that it is spoofing attack. The destination node 
will therefore flood accusations against the source node.
16. Other nodes may try to uncooperative like providing low quality of service or 
time delayed replies. These attacks are automatically handled by the trust values 
built by the nodes in the network. The trust level is constantly updated and when 
the trust values reach a very low value they are removed from the network. 
However, it is possible that a particular node may appear to have behaved badly 
due to some node being uncooperative or causing disturbance in the network. , In 
order to give consideration for such nodes each node is given k chances to prove 
its performance and if it fails it will be removed from the network.
17. A node can communicate only if it has a valid certificate.  If its certificate expires, 
the node floods a request for certificate renewal to its neighbors that are one hop 
away. The neighbors who receive the request will check if the requesting node is 
convicted or not. If it is not convicted and if they trust the node requesting the 
certificate, they reply, otherwise they do not reply. The time stamp of experience 
is given importance. .If node ‘B’ is requesting for a certificate from ‘A’,’A’ will 
reply only if it has a previous direct experience which is not outdated. Otherwise 
it will request ‘B’ for all the recommendation letters that it has received from the 
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other nodes in the network. Based on those letters ‘A’ will decide whether to 
reply or not. The same procedure is followed when there is no direct experience. 
The requesting node will collect all the replies and if the replies are at least k it 
forms a certificate; otherwise it is removed from the network. If a node couldn’t 
get k replies due to insufficient neighbors it moves to a new location to get more 
replies.
7.3.1 Advantages:
 This trust model handles various kinds attacks including DoS, spoofing, 
hijacking and Time delay attacks
 The number of innocent nodes suffered are minimal, since the hijacking 
nodes are removed by the trust model
 The  malicious nodes are removed as soon as there is an accusation against 
them .There is no need to wait until k nodes report the accusation as in 
scheme1 described in chapter 4
 The model is more realistic as it considers the selfish nature of the nodes. 
This takes into account the situations where nodes don’t reply to save their 
battery power.
 The real essence of trust is brought by this model by making the trust 
context specific. This model has two contexts, availability and quality of 
service
 The percentage of useful communication will be more dominating 
compared to scheme1 as each node selects a node that has good 
availability and Qos to communicate.
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7.3.2 Shortcomings:
 Each node needs to maintain a lot of information including its own 
recommendation letters. This will require more memory than scheme1.
 The computational requirements are higher as each node has to calculate the trust 
values, satisfactions etc.
 This scheme may therefore result in increased consumption of battery power.
7.4 Simulation assumptions:
       The following are the assumptions made for the simulation of the trust models:
 When the nodes initially enter into the network they  are granted certificates for 
communication
 Each node acts a router to route the packets to the destination. It is assumed that 
the node that it picks for communication will send the packet to its destination. 
The trust mechanism is therefore only applied at the end-points
 Threshold cryptography is used to share the secret key in the network. Every node 
in the network will be a part of the Certification Authority and every node in the 
CA will follow the rules for granting the certificate
 The threshold value is globally determined, for all nodes and for all network 
conditions.
 There is no congestion or noise in the network which may distort the 
communication among the nodes.
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 Whenever a node receives a set of request for certificate, they are processed in the 
order received without giving any priorities.
 The network is assumed to have 30 nodes out of which 15 are good nodes, 5 are 
spoofing nodes (Bad nodes) 5 are DoS attacking nodes and the reaming 5 are 
hijacking nodes.
 When a Hijacking node compromises a node , the compromised node is set free 
after a cycle of communication
 When a node is under DoS attack it will be freed from the attack once it is out of 
the proximity of the attacker.
 Only DoS attacking nodes send enormous number of requests.
 The same no of nodes remain for the entire length of simulation , no additional 
nodes enter or leave the network
 All nodes are assumed to have the same memory capacity, battery life and 
computational capacity
 All the nodes in the network are assumed to be homogenous
 Only DoS attacks, Hijacking, Spoofing and Time delay attacking nodes are 
present in the network.
 When any node observes malicious activity it is assumed that the node will flood 
an accusation in the network.
 Only one hop neighbors reply to certificate requests and the flooded messages are 
sent only to the one hop neighbors.
71
7.5 Results:
This section gives a detailed description of the performance and the comparison of   
the two trust models. The two trust models are compared in various aspects as 
described below:
 percentage of useful communication 
 The number of malicious & innocent nodes removed
 The number of malicious nodes remaining
 The number of good nodes remaining
 The network under the influence of DoS attacking nodes
 The network under the influence of hijacking nodes.
In all the graphs below scheme1 refers to the distributed trust model described in 
Chapter 4 and scheme 2 is the proposed trust model.

















































Figure 16: Comparison of the useful communication in the two trust models
Explanation:
 The graphs in figures 15, 16 compare the percentage of useful communication in the two 
models. The experiment was performed for 600 cycles of communication and was 
repeated for 30 times. Each value in the graph is an average value. From the two graphs 
above we can come to the conclusion that the proposed Scheme2 achieves a higher 
percentage of useful communication. Each time it is at least 10% greater than the 
performance of scheme1. All this achieved by maintaining good trust relationships 
among the nodes in the network.
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2.  Malicious and innocent nodes removed in the two models:




















Figure 17: Malicious and innocent nodes removed in scheme-1 
 
































The malicious nodes are completely removed in scheme-2 whereas there are some 
malicious nodes remaining in scheme-1 even after 600 cycles. The number of innocent 
nodes removed in scheme-2 is very few, around 3, while in scheme-1 about 11 nodes are 
removed. This is because in scheme1 the nearest node is selected for communication 
whereas in scheme2 a node is selected based on its availability and quality of service.
3. Malicious nodes remaining in the two models
Explanation: The two graphs below shown in figures 19, 20 illustrate the malicious 
nodes remaining in the two schemes. The malicious nodes in scheme-2 are all removed 
by the end of 100 cycles. But in scheme-1 they are not completely removed even by the 
end of 600 cycles. This shows that scheme-2 is very effective in handling the malicious 







































Figure 20: Malicious nodes remaining in Scheme-2 
 




















































Figure 22: Good nodes remaining in scheme-2 
 
Explanation:
The above graphs in figures 21, 22 show the number of good nodes remaining in the two 
schemes. The number of nodes in scheme-2 is 10, while there are only 4 nodes remaining 
in scheme-1 and these will be completely removed due the presence of hijacking nodes. 
These hijacking nodes are already removed in scheme-2 
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5. Network under the influence of DoS attacking nodes:


























Figure 23: Network under the influence of DoS attacking nodes (scheme-1)



























Figure 24: Network under the influence of DoS attacking nodes (scheme-2) 
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Explanation: The composition of the nodes is changed as there are 25 good nodes and 5 
DoS attacking nodes and there are no other nodes in the network. Under such situations 
the performance is compared. We can clearly see that scheme-1 doesn’t remove any DoS 
attacking nodes since it has no mechanism to remove them. When there is a mixture of 
malicious nodes they are removed by the hijacking nodes by pure chance of luck. Hence 
scheme-2 is effective in handling the DoS attacking nodes.






















Nodes under Dos attack
Figure 25: Network under the influence of DoS attacking nodes (scheme-1) 




























Figure 26: Network under the influence of DoS attacking nodes (scheme-2)
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Explanation:
The above graphs show that in scheme-1 the DoS attacking nodes are not removed and 
there are about 8 nodes under DoS attack. In scheme-2 all the DoS attacking nodes are 
removed and there is no node under Dos attack due to the presence of intrusion detection 
system in each node.
6. Network under the influence of hijacking nodes.
Explanation: The composition of the nodes is changed as there are 25 good nodes and 5 
hijacking nodes and there are no other nodes in the network. Under such situations the 
performance is compared. The graphs reveal on close observation that in scheme-1 the 
hijacking nodes are removed only by a chance of luck whenever a hijacking node hijacks 
another hijacking node. At 50 cycles it can be observed that there are 20 good nodes 
remaining, and 4 hijacking nodes remaining. The number of innocent nodes removed 
should be 5 but it is 6 which show that a hijacking node has attacked another hijacking 
node.


















Figure 27: Network under the influence of hijacking nodes (scheme-1)
80
















Figure 28: Network under the influence of hijacking nodes (scheme-1)

























Figure 29: Network under the influence of hijacking nodes (scheme-2)
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Figure 30: Network under the influence of hijacking nodes (scheme-2)
Explanation: Here it is clearly seen that the number of innocent nodes removed is 2 and 
the good nodes remaining is 18 and there are no hijacking nodes remaining. Hence from 
all the above graphs we can conclude that the proposed trust model works efficiently in 
removing the malicious nodes and protecting the innocent nodes and also in increasing 
the productivity of the network.
The graphs illustrate that the performance of the proposed trust model is superior 
to the performance of the trust model described in [19]. The Proposed model proves that 
by maintaining trust among the nodes the malicious nodes are effectively removed from 
the network. Since an ad hoc network is infrastructure less the nodes in the network 
should have some means of relying on the other nodes in the network. Hence trust 
relationships among the nodes should be established.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis we propose a Bayesian network trust model for certificate revocation in ad 
hoc wireless network. Furthermore, a detailed analysis is conducted of the performance 
of two different trust models for secure ad hoc wireless networks. This work has proved 
that a Bayesian network trust model outperforms the distributed trust model described in 
[19] by establishing good trust relationships among the nodes in the network. 
The percentage of useful communication in the network is improved by 
introducing context specific trust relationships among the nodes. The intrusion detection 
system of each node combined with its trust relationships with the other nodes effectively 
removed the malicious nodes in the network. The Bayesian network trust model handled 
various attacks like hijacking, Dos, spoofing and time delay. The goal of maximizing the 
removal of malicious nodes and minimizing the removal of innocent nodes from the 
network is achieved fairly by the proposed trust model.
8.1 Future work:
 The trust model in this work assumes only two parameters for trust (availability, 
quality of service) .The work can be improved by adding more parameters.
 The model can be enhanced by handling more attacks.
 More realistic results can be obtained by simulating the trust models in ns-2.
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 The battery usage of the nodes is not optimized which can be taken into 
consideration.
 This work doesn’t determine the threshold value K; this work can be combined 
with the determination of K.
 The nodes in the trust model maintain enormous amount of information; the 
model can be improved by efficient memory management schemes.
 The Trust model can be modeled under the influence of noise and the 
performance can be analyzed.
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The following program is the simulation of the Distributed Trust model without Bayesian 
network (Scheme 1) for ad hoc wireless networks using random waypoint model.
/*************************Simulation of scheme1**************************/
 Name: Sudha Chinni
 ID     : 000-408-765
 File   : scheme1.c
/*********************************************************************/







/**********************Declaration of Global variables***************************/
int lposition[50],m2=1,thresh=5,cycle;













/* Declaring a global structure for each node in the network*/
struct node
 {   
int id;//Node's Id
int accusers[50][50];//Certificate revocation List                 
int comments[50];
//comments about each node whether it is suspected or convicted
// in comments 1 means convicted, 0 means suspected
int tcert;//Certificate validity period
int speed;//Speed at which the node travels
int time1;// travel time
int length;//The x coordinate of the nodes position
int breadth;//The y coordinate if the nodes position
int destlength;//The x coordinate of the destination
int destbreadth;//The y coordinate of the destination
int distcovered;//The total distance covered by the node
intpausetime;//The total time the node pauses after reaching a
                               destination                      
int neighbors[50];//The list of neighbors for the node
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int request[50];//List of nodes requesting certificates
int reply;//The number of replies the node gets for its request for 
                             Certificate
int mode;//Defines the type of node (good, bad, Dos , hijacking)
int replytime;//The time the node takes to reply
int prevmode;
                //this mainly to used to restore the mode of nodes under dos attack
 //for the next communication cycle.  
int filesize;//size of the file to be transferred
int dspeed;//download speed;
int live;// for marking the nodes that are kicked out of network
int prevnode;
//The node with which the communication took place in previous cycle
int inode;
//The innocent node accused(in case of hijacking node or compromised node)
int cycle;//The cycle of communication
 };
//defining a structure of 50 nodes
struct node n[50];
/******************************Function main()***************************************/





       fp=fopen("summary.txt","w");//opening the summary file in write mode
for(k1=1;k1<601;k1++)//Repeating the program for a number of cycles
 {fprintf(fp,"\n The cycle of communication is %d",k1);
  cycle=k1;
  i1=1, m2=1;
for(i=0;i<50;i++)
certreq[i]=0;//initalizing the certificate request array, this array indicates 




     {case 1:    fprintf(fp,"\n\nINITIAL POSITIONS");
for(j=1;j<nos;j++)
                 {
                  nodeinit(j);
      }
break;
case 2:     fprintf(fp,"\n\nNEW POSITIONS OF THE NODES AFTER TRAVELLING");
for(j=1;j<nos;j++)
            {
if(n[j].live==1)
                   newposition(j);
          }
break;
case 3 :    fprintf(fp,"\n\nEACH NODE STARTS COMMUNICATING"); 
for(k=1;k<nos;k++)
            {
   communication(k);
              }
break;
case 4 :   revocation();
break;
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      }
 }
fprintf(fp,"\n\nNo of bad nodes removed = %d",malacious);
fprintf(fp,"\n\nNo of innocent nodes removed =%d",innocent);
for(i=1;i<nos;i++)
          {
if (n[i].mode==2&&n[i].live==1)










    compromised++;
         }
//printing the type of nodes remaining after each cycle
fprintf(fp,"\n\nNo of bad nodes remaining = %d",bad1);
fprintf(fp,"\n\nNo of Dos attacking nodes remianing = %d",dos1);
fprintf(fp,"\n\nNo of Hijacking attacking nodes remianing = %d",hijack);
fprintf(fp,"\n\nNo of nodes under Dos Attack = %d",dos);
fprintf(fp,"\n\nNo of good nodes remaining = %d",good);








}// end of major for loop
  }//end of main
/******************************Function nodeinit()************************************/
//This function initializes the various fields in each node 
void nodeinit(int i)
     {   int j,k;
 srand(50+i+cycle);//seeding the random generator
 fprintf(fp,"\n\nNode %d",i); 
         n[i].id=i;//assigning Id to the node
if (cycle==1)
 n[i].live=1;
//assiging the mode to the node
//Let mode 1 : good, 2 : Bad ,3: Dos attacking nodes ,4:node under Dos attack,5: 
Hijacking nodes  6:compromised node
if(cycle==1)








   n[i].mode=5;
//initializing the comments array
for(k=0;k<50;k++)
       {n[i].comments[k]=-1;
       }
89
                      n[i].prevmode=n[i].mode;






 n[i].replytime=rand()%5;  }
// Determine the initial position of the node
if(cycle==1)
   {
   n[k].cycle=1;
   lposition[i]=rand()%600;
       bposition[i]=rand()%600;
   n[i].length=lposition[i];
   n[i].breadth=bposition[i];
   }
 fprintf(fp,"\n\nPosition :%dX%d",n[i].length,n[i].breadth);
if (cycle==1)




//initializing speed and time
    n[i].speed=rand()%11;
    n[i].time1=rand()%21;
        fprintf(fp,"\n\nSpeed =%dm/sec,Traveltime=%ldseconds",n[i].speed,n[i].time1);
// initializing the destination
if(((n[i].length==n[i].destlength)&& (n[i].breadth==n[i].destbreadth))||cycle==1)
{ n[i].destlength=rand()%600;
      n[i].destbreadth=rand()%600;
}
//initializing the file size to be transferred and the download speed
n[i].filesize=rand()%500;
n[i].dspeed=rand()%30;
    fprintf(fp,"\n\nDestination:%dX%d",n[i].destlength,n[i].destbreadth);
    fprintf(fp,"\n");










    fprintf(fp,"\n\nNode%d",i);





fprintf(fp,"\n\nTotal Distance to travel =%g",totaldistance);






















              theta=atan(x);
}








                       else
{x=(double)(n[i].destbreadth-n[i].breadth)/(double)((-1)*(n[i].destlength-
n[i].length));
            theta=atan(x);
}
n[i].length=n[i].length - (distancecovered * cos(theta));
n[i].breadth=n[i].breadth + (distancecovered*sin(theta));
        }
//3rd quadrant







            theta=atan(x);
}
n[i].length=n[i].length - (distancecovered * cos(theta));
n[i].breadth=n[i].breadth - (distancecovered*sin(theta));
        }
//4th quadrant






            theta=atan(x);
}












//finding out the certificate validity period
fprintf(fp,"\n\nThe time remaining is %d",n[i].tcert);








// This function describes the nodes communication in the network
void communication(int k)
{ 











//since there is a valid certificate it has to determine the node with which it wants 
to communicate








   {  
if (refnode==j&&j!=(nos-1))












   }
if (l==0)
   {fprintf(fp,"\n\nThe node%d has no neighbors to communicate",k);
flag1=1;
   }
//if a node is under Dos attack, it will be under Dos attack as long as the it is in
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//the vicinity of the Dos attacking node
if(n[k].mode==4)
   { for(i=1;i<nos;i++)
       {
if(n[k].neighbors[i]==n[k].prevnode)
            {  flag2=1;
           n[k].mode=4;
            }
        }
if( flag2==0)
   n[k].mode=n[k].prevmode;
   }
//A node communicates only if it has a neighbor, if it has a valid certificate and if it 
is not under
// a Dos attack
if(n[k].tcert>0&&n[k].mode!=4&&flag1!=1)
   {
//now the node looks around its neighborhood it see any oberservable malacious 
activity
  intruders(k);
//the node calculates its distance to each of its neighbor
for(m=1;m<nos;m++)




  y=((n[m1].length-n[k].length)*(n[m1].length-n[k].length) + (n[m1].breadth-
n[k].breadth)*(n[m1].breadth-n[k].breadth));
   totaldistance=sqrt(y);
//fprintf(fp,"\n\nThe distance to node %d is %f",m1,totaldistance);
       min[p]=totaldistance;
   p++;
  }
     }
//The node picks up its nearest node to communicate
for(p=1;p<nos;p++)








   }
   }






  { min1=min[p];







  { min1=min[p];
        destnode=n[k].neighbors[p];




  fprintf(fp,"\n\nThe node %d has no node to communicate",k);
  n[k].prevnode=destnode;
//a node can communicate only if has another node to communicate with
if(destnode!=0&&n[destnode].mode!=4)
   {
   fprintf(fp,"\n\n The destnode is %d",destnode);
   n[destnode].prevnode=k;
//if the node is a hijacking node , it picks up an innocent node to accuse, it then
// floods an accusation in the network, it compromises the target node with which it 
communicates
// the compromised node also accuses the innocent node, the hijacking node will do the
//same for threshold number of cycles to remove the innocent node.
if(n[k].mode==5)
   { 
   n[k].cycle=n[k].cycle+1;
if(n[k].cycle==thresh+1)
   n[k].cycle=1;
if(n[k].cycle==1)









   }
    inode=n[k].inode;
n[destnode].mode=6;
n[destnode].inode=n[k].inode;
//accusing the innocent node
n[k].comments[inode]=1;
accusation(k,inode);
fprintf(fp,"\n\nInnocent node  is %d",inode);
   }
//the node in compromised mode
if(n[k].mode==6)
   {inode=n[k].inode;
    n[k].comments[inode]=1;
    accusation(k,inode);
//after accusing it comes out of the compromised mode and returns back to its 
previous mode
    n[k].mode=n[k].prevmode;
n[k].inode=0;
   }
//calculating pause time
// the maximum time for which the communication can take place is the time of Tcert of 
the
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//source node which is again based on its pause time and the reply time of the 
destination
   pausetime1=n[k].pausetime;
   pausetime=n[destnode].pausetime;
if(n[k].mode==3)
   n[destnode].mode=4;
if(n[k].prevmode==3)
   n[destnode].mode=4;//since a dos attacking node may be in mode 5 or 4 
if(n[k].pausetime>n[k].tcert)
   pausetime1=n[k].tcert;
if(n[destnode].pausetime>n[destnode].tcert)
        pausetime=n[destnode].tcert;
   n[k].tcert=n[k].tcert-pausetime1;





// if the certificate of the source node expires it sends a request for it
if(n[k].tcert==0)
 {
       certreq[m2]=k;
   m2++;
   }
//calculating the useful communication, which implies that the file that could be 
transferred by
// the node out the size that was expected to be transferred , since it is delimited 
by Tcert , reply time 
//and pause time of the two nodes in communication
 tfile=n[k].dspeed*pausetime1;
if(tfile>n[k].filesize)
   tfile=n[k].filesize;
   usefulcommu=usefulcommu+tfile;
if(pausetime1<=pausetime)
   tfile1=n[destnode].dspeed*pausetime1;
else
   tfile1=n[destnode].dspeed*pausetime;
if(tfile1>tfile)
   tfile1=tfile;
   usefulcommu1= usefulcommu1+tfile1;
if(pausetime1==0)
   fprintf(fp,"\n\n Pause time of node %d is 0",k);
if(pausetime==0)
   fprintf(fp,"\n\n Pause time of destnode %d is 0",destnode);
   fprintf(fp,"\n\n The tcert remaining is %d",n[k].tcert);
   fprintf(fp,"\n\n The tcert of dest node is %d",n[destnode].tcert);
   }
if(n[destnode].mode==4)
   {  n[destnode].tcert=0;//since it will not reply and pause untill its tcert is over
//calculating the % of useful communication
   tfile=n[k].dspeed*n[k].pausetime;
if(n[k].tcert<n[k].pausetime)
   n[k].pausetime=n[k].tcert;
if(tfile>n[k].filesize)
   tfile=n[k].filesize;
   usefulcommu=usefulcommu+tfile;
   }
   commucycle=((double)(usefulcommu1)/(double)(usefulcommu))*100;
   fprintf(fp,"\n\nThe '%' of useful communication is %f",commucycle); 
95
   }
else
   {   
int flag3=0; 
if(n[k].mode==4&&n[k].live==1)
   {fprintf(fp,"\n\nThe node %d is under DOS attack",k);
if(n[k].tcert<n[k].pausetime)
   n[k].pausetime=n[k].tcert;
   tfile=n[k].dspeed*n[k].pausetime;
if(tfile>n[k].filesize)
   tfile=n[k].filesize;
   usefulcommu=usefulcommu+tfile;
   flag3=1;
       commucycle=((double)(usefulcommu1)/(double)(usefulcommu))*100;
       fprintf(fp,"\n\nThe '%' of useful communication is %f",commucycle); 
      }
if(n[k].tcert==0&&n[k].live==1&&flag3==0)
   {fprintf(fp,"\n\nNo valid certificate to communicate");
   certreq[m2]=k;//requesting for certificate
    m2++;
commucycle=((double)(usefulcommu1)/(double)(usefulcommu))*100;
       fprintf(fp,"\n\nThe '%' of useful communication is %f",commucycle); 
   }
   flag1=0;
   flag2=0;
   flag3=0;
   }
}/*********************************Function intruders()********************************/









   {
   n[i].comments[target]=1;
// when a node is found to be convicted, all the accusations sent by the  convicted 
//node are cleared in the list of accusers.
for(k1=1;k1<nos;k1++)
   {n[i].accusers[k1][target]=0;
   }
for(k1=1;k1<50;k1++)
   {sum=0;
for(k2=1;k2<nos;k2++)
   {if(n[i].accusers[k1][k2]!=0)
    sum=sum+n[i].accusers[k1][k2] ;
   }
// if the number of accusers are >= threshold then the node is marked as convicted





   }
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//the accusation is flooded in the network
   accusation(i,target);
       }
     }
}
/******************************Function accusation()************************************/
//In this function when all nodes receive the flooded message they make a note of it in 
the certificate revocation list













     sum=sum+n[i].accusers[row][k1];
  }
if(sum>=thresh)









//Now each node will answer to the requests that it receives(request for certificate 
renewal)
// each node will decide whether to reply or not based on whether it is convicted or not
// if the node is convicted the certificate is not renewed
void revocation()
{  //now the request for the certificates is flooded in the network, certificate is  
granted





  { 
  n2=certreq[i];
for(j=1;j<nos;j++)
   {
    n3=n[n2].neighbors[j];










   }
   fprintf(fp,"\n\nThe Node %d has %d neighbours",n2,member);
if(member<thresh)
   {
fprintf(fp,"\n\n The certificate for %d cannot be revoked due to insufficient   
neighbours",n2); 
   certreq[i]=0;
   }
   member=0;
  }
}





    for(i=1;i<nos;i++)




    n11= n[i].request[j];
if (n[i].comments[n11]!=1)
    n[n11].reply=n[n11].reply+1;
}
    }
}





  { n[n22].tcert=20;
   fprintf(fp,"\n\nCERTIFICATES ARE REVOKED");




  fprintf(fp,"\n\nThe node %d is kicked out of the network ",n22);
      n[n22].live=0;
if (n[n22].prevmode==2)
  malacious++;//no of malicious nodes removed
else






/****************************End of Simulation (scheme1) ***************************/
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/*********************************************************************/
The following program is the simulation of the “Bayesian network Trust model
 (Scheme 2) ”for ad hoc wireless networks using random waypoint model.
  File: Scheme2.c
/*************************Simulation of scheme 2**************************/


























/* Declaring a global structure for each node in the network*/
struct node
 {   
int id;//Node's Id
int tcert;//Certificate validity period
int speed;//Speed at which the node travels
int time1;// travel time
int length;//The x coordinate of the nodes position
int breadth;//The y coordinate if the nodes position
int destlength;//The x coordinate of the destination
int destbreadth;//The y coordinate of the destination
int distcovered;//The total distance covered by the node
int pausetime;
//The total time the node pauses after reaching a destination
int neighbors[50];//The list of neighbors for the node
double neighbors1[50][15];//Trust table maintained by each node.
int request[50];//List of nodes requesting certificates
int reply;
//The number of replies the node gets for its request for certificate
int mode;//Defines the type of node(good,bad, Dos , hijacking)
int replytime;//this is for handshaking during communication
int prevmode;
//this mainly to used to restore the mode of nodes under dos attack
//for the next communication cycle.  
int filesize;//size of the file to be transferred
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int qos;//download speed;
int live;// for marking the nodes that are kicked out of network
int prevnode;//for marking the DOS attacking node
float wa;//weight for availability
float wq;//weight for quality of service
int prevaccused;//The node that was accused in previous cycle
float recoletters[50][4];//The list of recommendation letters
int posrecos[50];//The list of nodes giving positive recommendations
int negrecos[50];//The list of nodes giving negative recommendations
long int timestamp[50];//The time stamp of experience
int availability;// availability of the node
long int rtimestamp[50];
//The timestamp the recommendation letter was received
int nrequest;//no of requests placed by the source node
int splflag;//a flag to indicate the threshold of requests
int inode;// for node in mode 5 & 6
int cycle;//for node in mode 5
int comments[50][50];
//reason for which the previous accused node was removed
//1:mode2,2:dos,3:spoofing,4:info from trusted nodes
 };
//defining a structure of 50 nodes
struct node n[50];
/****************************************Function main()***************************/
// This function sequentially calls all the functions
 void main()
     {  
int ch=1,j,k1,k;
         fp=fopen("summary1.txt","w");//opening the summary file in write mode
for(k1=1;k1<601;k1++)//Repeating the program for a number of cycles
 {






 {case 1:    fprintf(fp,"\n\nINITIAL POSITIONS");
for(j=1;j<nos;j++)
             {
             nodeinit(j);
 }
break;
case 2:      fprintf(fp,"\n\nNEW POSITIONS OF THE NODES AFTER TRAVELLING");
for(j=1;j<nos;j++)
                {
if(n[j].live==1)
                 newposition(j);
 }
break;
case 3 :      if(cycle==1)
        neighbourhood();
break;
case 4 :      fprintf(fp,"\n\nEACH NODE STARTS COMMUNICATING"); 
for(k=1;k<nos;k++)
  {if(n[k].live==1)
                         communication(k);
   }
break;
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case 5 :       revocation();
break;
  }
       }
     }// end of major for loop
}//end of main
/******************************Function nodeinit()************************************/
//This function initializes the various fields in each node 
void nodeinit(int i)
         {int j;









 fprintf(fp,"\n\nNode %d",i); 
     n[i].id=i;//assigning Id to the node
if(cycle==1)
 { /* modes: 1- good node,2-bad node(spoofing),3-dos attacking node,
               (4-node under dos attack),5-nodes which will hijack other nodes,













               sa1=(float)sa/100;
   sum=sa1+sa22;//wa+wq should be equal to 1
while(sa2==0||sum!=1.0000)
            {sa2=rand()%100;
             sa22=(float)sa2/100;
             sum=sa1+sa22;
             }
n[i].wa=sa1;
n[i].wq=sa22;
fprintf(fp,"\n\n weight for availability is %f",sa1);
fprintf(fp,"\n\n weight for qos is %f",sa22);
 }








// Determining the initial position of the node
if(cycle==1)
        {
        n[i].length=rand()%600;
        n[i].breadth=rand()%600;
   }
  fprintf(fp,"\n\nPosition :%dX%d",n[i].length,n[i].breadth);
if (cycle==1)




//initializing speed and time
    n[i].speed=rand()%11;
    n[i].time1=rand()%21;
        fprintf(fp,"\n\nSpeed =%dm/sec,Traveltime=%ldseconds",n[i].speed,n[i].time1);
// initializing the destination
if(((n[i].length==n[i].destlength)&& (n[i].breadth==n[i].destbreadth))||cycle==1)
{ n[i].destlength=rand()%600;
      n[i].destbreadth=rand()%600;
}
//initializing the file size to be transferred and the download speed
n[i].filesize=rand()%500;
n[i].qos=rand()%30;
    fprintf(fp,"\n\nDestination:%dX%d",n[i].destlength,n[i].destbreadth);
    }        
        fprintf(fp,"\n\nMode =%d",n[i].mode);
    }
 }
/**********************************Function newposition()********************/






        fprintf(fp,"\n\nNode%d",i);
//calculating the distance between the nodes initial position and destination




fprintf(fp,"\n\nTotal Distance to travel =%g",totaldistance);






















                theta=atan(x);
}










            theta=atan(x);
}
n[i].length=n[i].length - (distancecovered * cos(theta));
n[i].breadth=n[i].breadth + (distancecovered*sin(theta));
        }
//3rd quadrant







            theta=atan(x);
}
n[i].length=n[i].length - (distancecovered * cos(theta));
n[i].breadth=n[i].breadth - (distancecovered*sin(theta));
        }
//4th quadrant






            theta=atan(x);
}









//finding out the certificate validity period
fprintf(fp,"\n\nThe time remaining is %d",n[i].tcert);
n[i].pausetime=rand()%20;







// this is done in this function as each node can have diff pause times
// based on the destination it has stopped.
}
/**************************Function neighbourhood()************************/
//The aim of this function is to fill in the start up values for trust
//all the nodes in the network scan their respective neighbors& get some 








//scanning the neighbors,transmission range is the nodes x,y position+100






   {  if (refnode==j&&j!=(nos-1))
       j=j+1;
if(refnode==j&&j==(nos-1))
break;
//calculating the trust values
/*description of neighbors1 [][] array, rows represent the nodes id,
   cols:0-pausetime,1-QOS,2:no of interactions in which availability was good
   3:no of interactions in which QOS was good,4:no of satisfying interactions
   5:total no of interactions,6:satisfaction as a service provider
   7: satisfaction as a recomender, 8: comments(0:suspect,1:convicted)
   9:Trust*/
if ((n[j].length<=reflength)&&(n[j].breadth<=refbreadth))
      {      
if(n[j].live==1)
         { printf("\n\n%d",j);
           n[i].neighbors[l]=j;
   n[i].neighbors1[j][0]=n[j].pausetime;
   n[i].neighbors1[j][1]=n[j].qos;
//calulating satisfaction form availability
   sa=(float)n[j].pausetime/n[i].pausetime;
if (sa>=n[i].wa)
   n[i].neighbors1[j][2]=1;
else
                              n[i].neighbors1[j][2]=0;
//calculating staisfaction from QOS
   sq=(float)n[j].qos/n[i].qos;
if(sq>=n[i].wq)
   n[i].neighbors1[j][3]=1;
else
                            n[i].neighbors1[j][3]=1;
if( (n[i].neighbors1[j][2]==1) && (n[i].neighbors1[j][3]==1))
   n[i].neighbors1[j][4]=1;
else
                               n[i].neighbors1[j][4]=0;







  __time64_t ltime;
                      _time64( &ltime );
//recording the timestamp of experience
  n[i].timestamp[j]=ltime;
                      l++;
          }
      }
       }
    }
 } 
/**********************************Function communication ()*******************/
// This function describes the nodes communication in the network
void communication(int k)
{ 









//since there is a valid certificate it has to determine the node with which





   {  
if (refnode==j&&j!=(nos-1))




 {   
if(n[j].live==1)






   }
if (l==1)
   {fprintf(fp,"\n\nThe node%d has no neighbors to communicate",k);
flag1=1;
   }
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if(n[k].tcert>0&&n[k].mode!=4&&flag1!=1)
   {
//each node scans its neighborhood for any observable malicious activity
//it floods the accusation in the network.
  intruders(k);
//now the source nodes picks up a node for communication, based upon weight given for 
the
//availability& qos the choice is made.
  fflag=0;
if(n[k].wa>=n[k].wq)
  { choice=1;
    targetnode(choice,k); 
  }
else
  {  choice=2;
      targetnode(choice,k);
  }
   fprintf(fp,"\n\nThe destnode of Node %d is %d",k,destnode); 
if(destnode==0)
fprintf(fp,"\n\n The node %d has no neighbor to communicate",k);
//once a choice for the destnode is made, both the nodes exchange their
// qos, availability, pausetime information
//pausetime,ie availability is calculated
if(destnode!=0)
{    




   {
           ID=rand()%30;
   }while(ID==0&&ID==k&&ID==destnode);
else
ID=k;
//The source node calculates the availability of the target node 
















//the nodes can communicate for the time the source is available
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//The availability of the destination is also important
//The useful communication is calculated: This is the file size transferred








//commureq is the actual file size that the source can transfer based on its 
//Tcert without taking the factors into account
 commureq=commureq+tfile1;
//commudone is the file transferred after taking all the factors into account
 commudone=commudone+tfile;
 usefulcommu=(double)commudone/(double)commureq *100;
 fprintf(fp,"\n\nThe percentage of useful communication is %f",usefulcommu);






















                        n[k].neighbors1[destnode][9]=100;
 }
else
                         n[k].neighbors1[destnode][9]= n[k].neighbors1[destnode][9]-10;
if(n[destnode].replytime>=timedelay)
  n[k].neighbors1[destnode][9]= n[k].neighbors1[destnode][9]-10;
//recording timestamp
 __time64_t ltime;
                      _time64( &ltime );
n[k].timestamp[destnode]=ltime;
n[k].tcert=n[k].tcert-n[k].pausetime;























   {if(n[destnode].neighbors1[ID][5]==1)
 n[destnode].neighbors1[ID][9]=90;
else
                        n[destnode].neighbors1[ID][9]= n[destnode].neighbors1[ID][9]-10;
   }
//recording timestamp
                      _time64( &ltime );
n[destnode].timestamp[ID]=ltime;
//handling DOS attacks
//if the no of requests exceed the threshold of requests, the destination node

























            n[k].recoletters[destnode][1]=n[destnode].neighbors1[k][9]; 
108
//recording the timestamp the recos were exchanged




fprintf(fp,"\n\nThe tcert of destnode is %d",n[destnode].tcert);
//the following block is executed if a node got recommendations for
//the destination node
//trust evolution for the nodes that recommended








   n[k].neighbors1[target][7]=0.6*n[k].neighbors1[target][7];
   }
//negative recommenders
for(i=0;i<nos;i++)
   { target=n[k].negrecos[i];
if(target>0)
   n[k].neighbors1[target][7]=0.6*n[k].neighbors1[target][7]-0.4;
   }
  }






   n[k].neighbors1[target][7]=0.6*n[k].neighbors1[target][7]-0.4;
   }
//negative recommenders
for(i=0;i<nos;i++)
   { target=n[k].negrecos[i];
if(target>0)
   n[k].neighbors1[target][7]=0.6*n[k].neighbors1[target][7];
   }
  }
}






// if the node is in mode 5 the following is done
// initially scan all the neighbors
if(n[k].mode==5)








            {
             inode=rand()%nos;
             }while(inode==0&&inode==k);
while(n[inode].live==0)
             {inode=rand()%nos;
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              }
         n[k].inode=inode;





               accusation(k,inode);
n[k].prevaccused=inode;
n[k].comments[inode][0]=1;










    }





  { node=n[k].comments[i][1];










































//In this function each node looks around its neighborhood for 








   {
   n[i].neighbors1[target][8]=1;
//the node previously accused
   n[i].prevaccused=target;
//the reason for accusing
   n[i].comments[target][0]=1;
//it floods the accusation in the network
   accusation(i,target);
       }
     }
}
/*****************************Function accusation()************************/








//Each node accepts the accusation only if it has














//each node calls this function to find an appropriate node to communicate 
//based on its weight given to availability&Qos




  {  destnode=n[k].neighbors[1];











     }
  }
if(choice==2)
  {  destnode=n[k].neighbors[1];











     }
 }
//once the destination node is picked, a check is made if there
//is a direct experience with the node, satisfaction from it,
//if its convicted etc.,if the results are not satisfactory the
//next best node is picked and the process is repeated
if(destnode!=0)







void check(int choice,int k,int destnode)
{long int timediff;
int i,reco;
  __time64_t utime;
if( 
n[destnode].live==0||n[destnode].mode==2||n[destnode].mode==6||n[destnode].tcert==0)




     n[k].neighbors[i]=0;
  }
      fflag=1;
  }
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//a check is made if the node is convicted
if(n[k].neighbors1[destnode][8]==1&&fflag==0)




     n[k].neighbors[i]=0;
  }
      fflag=1;
  }
    _time64( &utime );
//a check is made if there is direct experience with the target node
if(n[k].neighbors1[destnode][6]!=0&&fflag==0)
{timediff=utime- n[k].timestamp[destnode];
//if there is direct experience it should not be older than 20sec
if(timediff<20)
      { if(n[k].neighbors1[destnode][6]<st)
       { for(i=1;i<nos;i++)
         {if (n[k].neighbors[i]==destnode)
            n[k].neighbors[i]=0;
           }
             fflag=1;
          }
  }
}
//if there is a outdated experience or no direct experience
//the node seeks recommendation
        timediff=utime- n[k].timestamp[destnode];
if(timediff>=20&&fflag==0||n[k].neighbors1[destnode][5]==0&&fflag==0)




   n[k].neighbors[i]=0;
  }//if the recomendations are not satisfactory then another node
//is picked up for communication.




   }
}
/******************************Function recomendation()*******************/








  __time64_t ltime;
for(i=1;i<nos;i++)
   { //nodes could be selfish they may not send recommendations
   reply=rand()%2;
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if(n[i].neighbors1[destnode][5]>=1&&i!=k&&i!=destnode&&reply==1)
//first the p(e/h) is calculated
//for availability








//calculating post probability using Bayes theorem 















  _time64( &ltime );
      timediff=ltime-n[i].timestamp[destnode];
  trustref1=trustref1+n[k].neighbors1[i][7];
if(n[k].neighbors1[i][5]>=1)
  {//if the experience is latest
if(timediff<=20)
     {
  postprob=postprob*n[k].neighbors1[i][7];










      }
  }
else
    { //if the recommenders are unknown
untrust1++;
_time64( &ltime );













   }
   }










if(respond<thresh)//if the no of recommenders is less than threshold
 {
for(i=1;i<nos;i++) 
  {    _time64( &ltime );
//the target nodes recommendation letters are verified




  { if(n[destnode].recoletters[i][1]>=50)












{ //now the request for the certificates is flooded in the network, certificate is 
granted





//the neighbors for each node are scanned again








   {  
if (refnode==j&&j!=(nos-1))





 {   
if(n[j].live==1)




   }





  { 
  n2=certreq[i];
for(j=1;j<nos;j++)
   {
    n3=n[n2].neighbors[j];
if (n[n3].live==0||n[n3].mode==4)






{   member++; 
n[n3].request[i]=n2;
}
   }
   fprintf(fp,"\n\nThe Node %d has %d neighbours",n2,member);
if(member<thresh)
   {
   fprintf(fp,"\n\n The certificate for %d cannot be revoked due to insufficient 
neighbours",n2); 
   certreq[i]=0;
   }
   member=0;
  }
}










    n11= n[i].request[j];
if(n[i].neighbors1[n11][5]>=1)
{ if(n[i].neighbors1[n11][8]!=1)
   {
     _time64( &utime );         
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           timediff=utime-n[i].timestamp[n11];
if(timediff<=20)
     {
if(n[i].neighbors1[n11][6]>=st)
                  n[n11].reply=n[n11].reply+1;
// this is because a genuine node may suffer a reject due to mis-
satisfaction, hence
//it is given a chance for 5 times if it has a remark that











        {if(n[n11].recoletters[k][0]==1)
          {
             recos++;
if(n[n11].recoletters[k][1]>=50)
     precos++;
         }
}
if(recos==precos)












//if there is no direct experience




   {
for(k=1;k<nos;k++)
        {if(n[n11].recoletters[k][0]==1)
   { recos++;
if(n[n11].recoletters[k][1]>=50)
         precos++;
         }
}
if(recos==precos)




















  { n[n22].tcert=20;
   fprintf(fp,"\n\nCERTIFICATES ARE REVOKED");
   fprintf(fp,"\n\nThe Certificate of Node %d is revoked",n22);
  }
else
  { 
  fprintf(fp,"\n\nThe node %d is kicked out of the network ",n22);






























fprintf(fp,"\n\n Good nodes remaining :%d",good); 
 }
/*******************End Of Simulation(Scheme 2)*****************************/
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